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THE DORMANT FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
AFTER WYNNE
Michael S. Knoll* and Ruth Mason**
This Essay surveys dormant foreign Commerce Clause doctrine
to determine what limits it places on state taxation of international
income, including both income earned by foreigners in a U.S. state
and income earned by U.S. residents abroad. The dormant
Commerce Clause similarly limits states’ powers to tax interstate
and foreign commerce; in particular, it forbids states from
discriminating against interstate or international commerce. But
there are differences between the interstate and foreign commerce
contexts, including differences in the nationality of affected
taxpayers and differences in the impact of state taxes on federal tax
and foreign-relations goals. Given current Supreme Court doctrine,
we provide states guidance as to how to conform their regimes for
taxing international income to constitutional requirements.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has long interpreted the dormant interstate
Commerce Clause to limit state tax powers, including by interpreting it to
forbid states from using their tax systems to discriminate against interstate
commerce. This Essay considers the limits imposed by the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause on state tax powers. We use a recent Utah Supreme Court
case that we believe to be wrongly decided, Steiner v. Utah State Tax
Commission, to illustrate our inquiry. Although the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Steiner,1 the case raised questions that will be important as other
1

Steiner v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 449 P.3d 189 (Utah 2019).
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state courts, and ultimately perhaps the Supreme Court, consider the impact
of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause on state taxes.
In our analysis, we pay special attention to the implications for foreign
commerce of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Comptroller of the
Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne. In Wynne, an interstate commerce case, the
Supreme Court confirmed that the value pursued by the nondiscrimination
requirement of the dormant Commerce Clause was prevention of
protectionism, and the Court furthermore confirmed that the internal
consistency test was a reliable way for courts to identify unconstitutionally
protectionist taxes.2 Under the internal consistency test, the reviewing court
imagines that all states apply the challenged state’s rule. It then asks, under
these conditions of hypothetical harmonization, whether interstate commerce
suffers more tax than in-state commerce. If so, the challenged regime is
unconstitutional unless justified or explicitly approved by Congress.
Although the Supreme Court has applied the internal consistency test by
name for more than three decades,3 Wynne was the first case to acknowledge
its “economic bona fides” as a test for protectionism.4 The great virtue of
Wynne is that by providing a principled approach firmly grounded in
economics to resolve tax discrimination cases, it promised to lead dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine out of what the Supreme Court itself has
described as a “quagmire.” But Wynne can only lead courts out of the
doctrinal quagmire if lower courts apply it, which the Utah Supreme Court
refused to do.5 Although the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged its
obligation to follow controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent, it concluded
that — given the “lack [of] any clear overarching theory”6 for the dormant
Commerce Clause — the Utah court itself would “decline to extend [the U.S.
Supreme Court’s] precedent into new territory — even in ways that might
seem logical in other jurisprudential realms.”7
In contrast with the conclusions of the Utah Supreme Court, this Essay
argues that the best reading of Supreme Court doctrine is that Wynne and its
internal consistency test applies broadly as a rule for identifying state tax
discrimination in both the interstate and foreign Commerce Clause contexts.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the applicability of
the internal consistency test to dormant foreign Commerce Clause cases, and
it has never suggested that the test does not apply in such cases.8 The Utah
court’s refusal to follow Wynne essentially sets up a two-tiered system under
which some states — those that adhere to Supreme Court precedent9 — are
2

Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787.
See id. at 1802 (also tracing the test back to the 1930s, “[a]lthough we did not use the
term in those cases”).
4
See id.
5
See infra Part II.
6
See Steiner, 449 P.3d at 193.
7
Id.
8
See infra Part I.B.
9
Kathleen K. Wright, The Decision in Wynne and the Impact on the States, 83 TAX
NOTES ST. 187 (2017) (detailing state implementation of Wynne).
3
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constrained from enacting protectionist taxes. But other states, including
Utah, remain freer to engage in protectionism.
Part I of this Essay provides background on both the interstate and
foreign dormant Commerce Clause doctrines, including in-depth doctrinal
analysis of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. Although there are some
differences between the doctrines, the Supreme Court interprets both clauses
to forbid discrimination, and in both contexts, the Court has recognized that
protectionist taxes discriminate. Thus, the Court considers internal
consistency — which is a test for protectionism — relevant to both contexts.
In light of substantial criticism of the dormant Commerce Clause both on and
off the bench for being atextual, we conclude Part I by showing that dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine has the support of a large majority of the current
justices of the Supreme Court.
Part II criticizes the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Steiner. We show
that the Utah tax regime upheld in Steiner was structurally nearly identical to
the Maryland tax regime struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wynne.
The main difference was that the Maryland regime discriminated against
interstate commerce, whereas the Utah regime discriminated against
international commerce. To be specific, Utah taxed its residents’ worldwide
income at 5%. It likewise taxed nonresident aliens on their Utah-source
income at 5%.10 Although Utah allowed its residents credits for taxes
imposed by other U.S. states, it allowed no credits for foreign taxes. Such a
regime is internally inconsistent because it overtaxes international income
relative to in-state income, and hence, under dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine, it is unconstitutional unless justified or specifically approved by
Congress. Although the Utah Supreme Court refused to apply relevant
Supreme Court precedent in Steiner, other states’ courts may face questions
about the constitutionality of their state tax regimes because many states tax
nonresident aliens’ income at a flat rate and residents’ worldwide income at
a flat rate, but do not fully credit foreign taxes.11 Because Wynne made clear
that such a tax system unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate
commerce, taxpayers in other states are likely to challenge those states
international tax regimes. Part II thus provides insight as to how Wynne and
other aspects of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine limit state taxation of
foreign commerce.
Acknowledging that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states
from discriminating against international income does not imply that states
10

The current Utah statutory tax rate is 4.95%. From 2008 through 2017, which
includes the years at issue in Steiner, the rate was 5%. UTAH STATE TAX COMM’N, TAX RATES,
https://incometax.utah.gov/paying/tax-rates (last visited Mar. 1, 2020). Throughout this Essay,
we use a 5% rate for simplicity.
11
Of the 43 states that tax personal income, most offer no credits for foreign income; a
handful restrict the availability of the credits (mostly to Canada); and 10 states (Arizona,
Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, and West
Virginia) appear to generally offer tax credits on foreign income. Accordingly, at least half of
the states are potentially at risk for violating the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. See
BLOOMBERG TAX AND ACCOUNTING, LAW CHART BUILDER INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX, https://
pro.bloombergtax.com/state-tax-resources/ (requires purchase of chart-building product).
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must always credit foreign taxes. Thus, in Part III, we consider a variety of
options available to states to make their international tax regimes internally
consistent.
II.

DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE

This Part gives background on the dormant Commerce Clause. Subpart
A describes the values pursued by the dormant Commerce Clause, and it
briefly reviews the development of the doctrine from its historical roots to
the present. Because Steiner involves a discrimination challenge, we pay
special attention to the Supreme Court’s discrimination jurisprudence,
including the Court’s most important case, Comptroller of the Treasury of
Maryland v. Wynne. Decided in 2015, Wynne reaffirmed that the
nondiscrimination principle in the dormant Commerce Clause prevents states
from enacting protectionist taxes and in Wynne, the Supreme Court
acknowledged internal consistency as an appropriate test for determining
whether a state tax is protectionist.12
Subpart B extensively reviews the Supreme Court’s few dormant foreign
Commerce Clause cases, which reveal that, like the dormant interstate
Commerce Clause, the dormant foreign Commerce Clause also forbids
protectionism. For completeness, although they are not directly relevant for
Steiner, Subpart B also critically reviews some additional doctrinal
restrictions on states that apply under the foreign, but not interstate, dormant
Commerce Clause. These include the requirement that state taxes not create
a substantial risk of multiple international taxation and that state taxes not
prevent the federal government from speaking with one voice in international
commerce issues.
Subpart C argues that despite criticism — including from Justices
Gorsuch, Thomas and the late Justice Scalia — a majority of the current
justices of the Supreme Court continue to interpret the Commerce Clause to
impliedly limit state taxing powers, in particular by prohibiting
discrimination, that is, protectionist taxation.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause After Wynne
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the
power “to regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes.”13 Although an affirmative grant of power
to Congress, the Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause
contains a “dormant” or negative implication that limits the ability of state
and local governments to also regulate commerce. The dormant Commerce
Clause has “deep roots” that extend back to the debates surrounding the
drafting of the Constitution and its ratification.14 For nearly 200 years, the

12
13
14

Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1802 (2015).
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794.
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Supreme Court has recognized the principle that the Commerce Clause, by
its own force and effect and without the need for any congressional action,
limits the ability of states to regulate cross-border commerce.15 The
animating principle advanced by the dormant Commerce Clause was perhaps
most clearly and cogently articulated by Justice Robert H. Jackson, who in
1949 wrote:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce
by the certainty that he will have free access to every market
in the Nation, that no home-embargoes will withhold his
exports, and no foreign state will by custom duties or
regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may
look to the free competition from every producing area in
the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was
the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this
Court which has given it reality.16
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, states may not discriminate
against or unduly burden interstate commerce.17 Discriminatory taxes are
almost always fatal. According to the Supreme Court, “if a state law
discriminates against out-of-state goods or nonresident economic actors, the
law can be sustained only on a showing that it is narrowly tailored to advance
a legitimate local purpose”18 or that it has explicit congressional approval.19
Only if state laws or regulations do not discriminate against interstate

15

The seminal case is Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
17
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794 (“By prohibiting States from discriminating against or
imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval, it strikes
at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and
other laws that burdened interstate commerce.”).
18
Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2462 (2019)
(citations and quotation marks omitted); Oregon Waste v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S.
93, 100–01 (1994) (“Because the Oregon surcharge is discriminatory, the virtually per se rule
of invalidity provides the proper legal standard here, not the Pike balancing test. As a result,
the surcharge must be invalidated unless the respondents can show that it advances a legitimate
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by legal nondiscriminatory alternatives. Our
cases require that justifications for discriminatory restrictions on commerce pass the strictest
scrutiny. The State’s burden of justification is so heavy that facial discrimination by itself may
be a fatal defect.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
19
Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California,
451 U.S. 648, 652–53 (1981) (“if Congress ordains that the states may freely regulate an aspect
of interstate commerce, any action taken by the state within the scope of congressional
authorization is rendered invulnerable to a Commerce Clause challenge”); Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980) (“Congress, of course, has power to regulate
the flow of interstate commerce in ways that the states, acting independently, may not. And
Congress, if it chooses, may exercise this power indirectly by conferring upon the states an
ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy.”).
16
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commerce does the Court go on to evaluate them under the undue-burden
standard, but we do not consider undue burdens here in this essay.20
Since 1977, the Supreme Court has used a four-part test announced in
Complete Auto Transit v. Brady to evaluate whether state taxes are consistent
with the dormant Commerce Clause.21 To be compatible with the dormant
Commerce Clause under the Complete Auto test, a state tax must (1) apply
only to taxpayers with a substantial nexus to the state; (2) be fairly
apportioned, meaning internally and externally consistent;22 (3) not
discriminate against cross-border commerce; and (4) be fairly related to
services provided by the state.23 A tax that fails the Complete Auto test would
be struck down absent a compelling justification or Congressional
approval.24 The Court’s announcement of the Complete Auto test marked an
important turning point in dormant Commerce Clause doctrine away from
legal formalism and toward substantive inquiry into the economic
consequences of a state’s laws.25 Notwithstanding this advance, Complete
Auto failed to provide clear guidance to states, taxpayers, and lower courts.26
Recent cases, however, have improved the clarity and workability of the
Complete Auto test.27 Because Steiner involved a question of tax
discrimination, we focus on the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, which cleared out much
of the controversy surrounding the dormant Commerce Clause by confirming

20

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794. For more on undue burdens, see Adam Thimmesch, The
Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, TEMPLE L. REV. 2 (forthcoming 2020); Thomas B.
Nachbar, The Peculiar Case of State Network Neutrality Regulation, 37 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 659 (2019).
21
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
22
We explain internal consistency presently and external consistency in Part II.C.1,
infra.
23
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
24
See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1793 (reiterating the Complete Auto test).
25
See id. at 1795–96 (reviewing doctrine under the dormant Commerce Clause,
describing Complete Auto as a return to substantive inquiry after “earlier formalism”).
26
The leading state tax treatise on the dormant Commerce Clause details the problems
with the Complete Auto test, including criticism of it by Supreme Court justices. See 3 WALTER
HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE TAXATION § 4.12 (3d ed. 2019); see also Jesse H.
Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Object-Measure
Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193 (1998); Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 73 LA. L. REV. 979 (2013); Hayes Holderness, Navigating 21st
Century Tax Jurisdiction, 79 MD. L. REV. 1 (2019); Bradley W. Joondeph, Rethinking the Role
of the Dormant Commerce Clause in State Tax Jurisdiction, 24 VA. TAX REV. 109 (2004);
Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1115
(2016); Thimmesch, supra note 20; Edward A. Zelinksy, Restoring Politics to the Commerce
Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on
Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 29 (2002); Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking
Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX.
REV. 1 (2008).
27
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). This Essay does not focus
on the nexus prong of Complete Auto, nor does it consider undue burdens. For more on
Wayfair, see Ruth Mason, Implications of Wayfair, 46 INT’L TAX REV. 810 (2018). See also
Thimmesch, supra note 20; Holderness, supra note 26.
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that the nondiscrimination rule has a specific meaning: it prevents the states
from enacting protectionist regulations and taxes, or, equivalently, it requires
states to maintain a level tax and regulatory playing field between in-state
and out-of-state commerce.28 Although this anti-protectionist principle
underlying the dormant Commerce Clause had long been acknowledged,
translating that principle into clear judicial guidance was neither smooth nor
consistent before Wynne.29 The Court in Wynne clarified the importance of
economic analysis to dormant Commerce Clause review, and the Court
expressly connected the definition of discrimination to a doctrinal test for
discrimination, the internal consistency test.
Developed by the Court in the early 1980s to resolve tax apportionment
cases,30 the continued relevance of the internal consistency test was uncertain
at the time the Court granted certiorari in Wynne.31 Under internal
consistency, a reviewing court assumes that all other states adopt the
challenged state’s tax rules.32 The court then asks whether, under those
conditions of hypothetical harmonization, cross-border commerce would be
taxed more heavily than in-state commerce.33 If so, then the court nearly

28

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787.
For the argument that the nondiscrimination principle in the dormant Commerce
Clause forbids protectionism, see generally Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, The Economic
Foundation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 103 VA. L. REV. 309 (2017) [hereinafter Knoll
& Mason, Economic Foundation]; Ryan Lirette & Alan D. Viard, Putting the Commerce Back
in the Dormant Commerce Clause: State Taxes, State Subsidies, and Commerce Neutrality,
24 J. L. & POL’Y 467 (2016). For the argument that the dormant Commerce Clause more
generally, including undue-burden doctrine, principally forbids intentional protectionism, see
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
30
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983) (“the first and again
obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal
consistency — that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would
result in no more than all of the unitary business’ income being taxed.”). The origins of the
test can be traced back further. See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802 (referring to cases decided as
early as 1938 and noting that “[a]lthough we did not use the term in those cases, we held that
those schemes could be cured by taxes that satisfy what we have subsequently labeled the
‘internal consistency’ test”).
31
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1820–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This Court has not
rigidly required States to maintain internally consistent tax regimes. Before today, [the Court]
. . . has not struck down a state tax for failing the test in nearly 30 years . . . . Moreover, the
Court has rejected challenges to taxes that flunk the test.”) (internal citations omitted). For
discussion of the case in which the Court upheld an internally consistent tax, see infra note
34. See also Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at 312 (noting pre-Wynne
doubts about the “continued relevance” of the test).
32
See, e.g., Container, at 169. See also Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1803 (citing “numerous
cases in which we have applied the internal consistency test in the past”).
33
See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802. See also Oklahoma Tax Comm ‘n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (test looks to “whether [a tax’s] identical application by
every State in the Union would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with
commerce intrastate”).
29
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always strikes down the tax as discriminatory.34 Conversely, courts typically
uphold internally consistent taxes.35
Wynne involved discrimination that was obscured within Maryland’s
facially neutral tax regime.36 The Maryland income tax consisted of both a
state and a county component. Only the county tax was at issue. The county
tax applied to residents’ in-state and out-of-state income at a flat rate between
1.25% to 3.2%, depending upon the county of residence.37 Nonresidents paid
county tax on Maryland-source income at the lowest rate, 1.25%.38 Residents
were not entitled to a credit against the country tax for taxes paid to other
jurisdictions.39 This regime is facially neutral: nonresidents do not pay a
higher tax rate on Maryland-source income than do Maryland residents, and
Maryland residents do not pay a higher tax rate on out-of-state income than
on in-state income. Nonetheless, in response to a challenge by the Wynnes,
Maryland’s highest court struck down the tax regime for violating the
dormant Commerce Clause.40
The Wynnes were Maryland residents whose county taxed their
worldwide income at 3.2%.41 The Wynnes challenged the tax regime under
the dormant Commerce Clause, arguing that because Maryland did not credit
the taxes they paid to other states up to the full amount of the county tax due
on the same income, Maryland discouraged them from earning income from
other states in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.42 Among the
defenses raised by Maryland were that the dormant Commerce Clause did
not apply to individual taxpayers, that residence states may tax all their
residents’ income (wherever derived), and that states are under no obligation
to relieve double tax.43
34

See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court
previously upheld a “concededly” internally inconsistent tax) (citing American Trucking
Assns. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429 (2005)). But see id. at 1802 n. 7
(disputing that the Court had conceded that the tax in American Trucking was internally
consistent). In our view, the tax challenged in American Trucking, which was an
unapportioned flat tax on trucks that made deliveries in Michigan, was indeed internally
inconsistent, and therefore functioned equivalently to a tariff and should have been struck
down.
35
The Court will uphold such taxes unless they impose an undue burden on interstate
commerce. Discrimination and undue burden are the two ways that taxes and regulations can
be found in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
36
For analysis of Wynne, see generally Knoll & Mason (2017), Economic Foundation,
supra note 29.
37
MD. CODE ANN., TAX–GEN. § 10-103(a)(1) (2010).
38
MD. CODE ANN., TAX–GEN. §§ 10-103(a)(1), 10-703(a) (2010).
39
MD. CODE ANN., TAX–GEN. §, 10-703(a), (c) (2010).
40
Md. State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453 (Md. 2013), aff’d sub
nom. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
41
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792 (2015).
42
Id. See also Md. State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 460 (Md.
2013).
43
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1797 (Maryland’s argument that the dormant Commerce
Clause does not apply to individuals); id. at 1800 (principal dissenters’ argument that
Maryland was entitled to tax all its residents’ worldwide income); id. at 1801–02 (principal
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After holding that the dormant Commerce Clause applies to individuals
as well as corporations,44 and confirming that the dormant Commerce Clause
neither forbids states from taxing all their residents’ worldwide income nor
forbids all double taxation,45 a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court
nevertheless held that the Maryland tax regime violated the dormant
Commerce Clause because it discriminated against interstate commerce.46
The Maryland regime involved no facial discrimination — it did not overtly
tax interstate commerce at a higher rate than domestic commerce. Applying
the internal consistency test, however, revealed the discriminatory impact
inherent in the regime. The insight of Wynne, and the reason the Court
reaffirmed the internal consistency test, was that taxes that fail the internal
consistency test are protectionist as an economic matter, but taxes that pass
the test are not. As the Court explained:
By hypothetically assuming every state has the same tax structure,
the internal consistency test allows courts to isolate the effect of a
defendant state’s tax scheme. This is a virtue of the test because it
allows courts to distinguish between (1) tax schemes that inherently
discriminate against interstate commerce without regard to the tax
policies of other states, and (2) tax schemes that create disparate
incentives to engage in interstate commerce (and sometimes result in
double taxation) only as a result of the interaction of two different
but nondiscriminatory and internally consistent schemes. The first
category of taxes is typically unconstitutional; the second is not.47
Thus, rather than sideline or abandon internal consistency, in Wynne, the
Supreme Court elevated it to the principal test for tax discrimination.48

dissenter’s argument that the dormant Commerce Clause does not require states to relieve
double taxation).
44
Id. at 1797.
45
Id. at 1805. For more on the distinction between double taxation and tax
discrimination, see Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at 336–42. See id.
at 333 (noting that “eight of the nine justices [in Wynne] agreed that the Constitution does not
categorically forbid double taxation”).
46
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.
47
Id. at 1802 (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 1805 (“The internal consistency
test and economic analysis . . . confirm that the tax scheme operates as a tariff and
discriminates against interstate commerce, and so the scheme is invalid.”). In arriving at this
conclusion, the Court relied on economic analysis provided by us and by a group of tax
economists in separate briefs. See id. at 1802, 1804, 1806 (citing Knoll and Mason Brief as
amici curiae and citing Brief for Tax Economists as amici curiae). We first presented this
mode of economic analysis in an academic article. Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What is
Tax Discrimination?, 121 YALE L.J. 1014 (2012). For more on how internal consistency
identifies protectionist taxes, see Knoll and Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at
318–29; Lirette & Viard, supra note 29, at 495–500. For a thorough discussion of how the
internal consistency test would apply to past Supreme Court cases and difficult open doctrinal
questions, see generally id.
48
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1803.
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With its “economic bona fides”49 thus uncovered, the internal
consistency test now provides a principled way to resolve tax discrimination
cases under the dormant Commerce Clause. By giving courts a method to
affirmatively identify taxes that have effects economically equivalent to
tariffs,50 the internal consistency test operationalizes the anti-protectionist
goals underlying the dormant Commerce Clause. Because the test is limited
and behaves in a rule-like fashion, it identifies protectionism without
unnecessarily encroaching on state autonomy.51 Plus, although economic
analysis supports using the internal consistency test as a tool for identifying
protectionist taxes, it is easy to apply; one need not be an economist to apply
it.
Committed to the internal consistency test as a means of verifying
whether state taxes function economically equivalently to tariffs,52 the
Supreme Court in Wynne assumed that all other states would adopt
Maryland’s regime, and then it asked whether cross-border commerce would
face more tax than domestic commerce.53 To simplify the application of the
internal consistency test, in our example we will let Delaware stand as a
proxy for all other states.54 Assuming that Delaware adopted Maryland’s tax
system, then Maryland residents, including the Wynnes, would pay tax at
3.2% on their in-state income, but at 4.45% on their out-of-state income. This
is so because when they earned income in Maryland, they would pay only
the 3.2% tax to their county. But when they earned income in Delaware, they
would pay not only the 3.2% tax to their Maryland county, but also the 1.25%
nonresident tax to Delaware. Because the Maryland tax regime did not allow
a credit against the Maryland county tax for any taxes paid to other states,
the Maryland regime taxed cross-border income more heavily than purely instate income. As a result, the Supreme Court held that the Maryland tax was
internally inconsistent and struck it down. Table 1 illustrates the internal
consistency test applied to Maryland law:

49

Id.
West Lynn Creamery Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) (“The paradigmatic
example of a law discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective tariff or customs
duty, which taxes goods imported from other States, but does not tax similar products
produced in State.”).
51
Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at 339 (“The internal
consistency test preserves . . . tax sovereignty to enact a variety of nondiscriminatory taxes”).
Id. at 354 (“A virtue of the internal consistency test is that it goes no further than necessary to
achieve [the goal of identifying discriminatory taxes] . . . . Thus, the . . . internal consistency
test provide[s] states with wide, but not unfettered, discretion.”).
52
The Wynne majority repeatedly analogized Maryland’s income-tax regime to a tariff.
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804, 1805, 1806–07.
53
Id. at 1803.
54
The Supreme Court also allows a single other state to stand in for all other states
when it conducted internal consistency analysis in Wynne. Id. at 1803–04 (conducting internal
consistency test analysis using “State B”).
50

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550746

368

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 39:3:357

TABLE 1: Maryland Tax Under Internal Consistency
Delaware Resident

Maryland Resident

Maryland Source

4.45%

3.2%

Delaware Source

3.2%

4.45%

In Table 1, the shaded cells represent interstate commerce, while the
unshaded cells represent in-state commerce. In Wynne, the Supreme Court
applied the internal consistency test to reveal that if every state adopted
Maryland’s regime, interstate commerce would bear more tax than in-state
commerce.55 The Wynne Court held that this excess burden on interstate
commerce violated the dormant Commerce Clause.56
Besides confirming internal consistency as a test for protectionism, a
second important point emerges from Wynne. The familiar paradigm of
dormant Commerce Clause cases involves a nonresident who challenges the
protectionist practices of a state. But Wynne involved a claim brought by
residents against their own state. In Wynne, the Supreme Court confirmed
prior doctrine holding that residents could challenge their own states’ rules.
In prior academic work, we have emphasized that this outcome is logical,
given the Court’s views on discrimination. 57 Every discriminatory tax results
in two distortions to where taxpayers earn income, and these distortions run
in opposite directions. 58 A state’s regime is protectionist whenever it
undermines the comparative advantage of nonresidents who earn income
within the state relative to residents who earn income within the state. But
protectionist taxes do more than discourage nonresidents from engaging in
commerce within the state. Because they also undermine the comparative
advantage that residents have over nonresidents on income earned outside
the state, protectionist taxes also discourage residents from engaging in
commerce outside the state.59 We refer to the second type of distortion as
retentionist. 60 Protectionist taxes keep outsiders out; retentionist taxes keep
55

Id. at 1803. The internal consistency test identifies the fact and amount of the excess
burden; Maryland taxes interstate commerce at 1.25% more than domestic commerce. To
alleviate that excess burden, Maryland could increase its credit of other states’ taxes, decrease
its own tax of residents out-of-state income, or decrease its tax of nonresidents’ Maryland
income. On possible remedies for Maryland’s tax regimes, see Knoll & Mason Brief, supra
note 47, at 28–32. The Wynne majority agreed with our analysis of the remedy issue. Wynne,
135 S. Ct. at 1806 (citing the Knoll & Mason Brief). On remedies for internally inconsistent
taxes more generally, see Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at 342–45.
56
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.
57
Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at 318–29.
58
For more on the two-directional effect of discriminatory taxes, see Mason & Knoll,
supra note 47, at 1056–60 (referring to a “two-directional distortion”).
59
Protectionist taxes do this by making it more attractive for residents to earn income
at home; only when they earn income at home can they secure the protectionist advantages
the state provides them when it discriminates against outsiders.
60
Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at 320.
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insiders in. Both protectionist and retentionist taxes by their nature have bidirectional effects; protectionist taxes create retentionist effects and vice
versa.61 Thus, the dormant Commerce Clause could not effectively prohibit
protectionist taxation if it did not apply to both inbound and outbound
commerce. Thus, it makes sense for a legal rule that prohibits protectionism
to also prohibit retentionism, and it makes sense for courts to allow residents
like the Wynnes to challenge their own state’s tax rules when those rules
discriminate against out-of-state income in favor of in-state income.62
Thus, Wynne establishes several important points.63 First, the Court
confirmed that the dormant Commerce Clause applies to taxes imposed on
individuals by their own states.64 Second, although states have authority to
tax their residents’ worldwide income, the dormant Commerce Clause limits
the exercise of that authority. In particular, states may not impose retentionist
taxes on their residents.65 Third, economic analysis is essential to judicial
review of state tax rules for discrimination under the dormant Commerce
Clause.66 The Court stated clearly that the nondiscrimination principle under
the dormant Commerce Clause prevents protectionism; states may not use
their tax and regulatory systems to impose the functional equivalent of tariffs
on interstate commerce.67 Fourth, and most important, the Court affirmed the
internal consistency test as a convenient and reliable test for protectionism
and, consequently, discrimination.68 Internally inconsistent taxes are
protectionist and therefore discriminatory; they violate the dormant
61

Id. at 321 (“all discriminatory taxes have both protectionist and retentionist
impacts”).
62
Id. at 320 (“Although the protectionist effect of the Maryland tax regime was not at
issue in Wynne, we can describe it. Because the Maryland tax regime discouraged Marylanders
from earning out-of-state income, it upset the comparative advantage nonresidents may
otherwise have had over Marylanders when competing for work and investments in
Maryland.”).
63
Much has been written about Wynne and why a failure of internal consistency reveals
as an economic matter that a state tax functions equivalently to a tariff. See references in supra
note 29.
64
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1797 (2015).
65
The Wynne Court did not use the term retentionist; that the dormant Commerce
Clause forbids retentionism is an implication of the Court’s holdings that the dormant
Commerce Clause forbids protectionism and applies to challenges brought by residents against
their own states. Id. at 1805 (refuting claim by dissenters that the majority’s ruling “requires
a State taxing on residence to ‘recede’ to a State taxing on source . . . We establish no such
rule of priority. To be sure, Maryland could remedy the infirmity in its tax scheme by offering,
as most States do, a credit against income taxes paid to other states”) (internal citations
omitted). See also Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at 351 (noting that
under Wynne, “Maryland’s choices about its source taxes constrain its own residence taxes
and vice versa. But other states’ tax rate choices constrain neither Maryland’s source nor its
residence taxes. Under a competitive neutrality conception of nondiscrimination, each state
sets its taxes independently of every other state, but no state may set its source taxes
independently of its own residence taxes, or vice versa.”).
66
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1803.
67
Id. at 1804.
68
Id. (“The internal consistency test reveals what the undisputed economic analysis
shows: Maryland’s tax scheme is inherently discriminatory and operates as a tariff.”).
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Commerce Clause except where stringently justified or congressionally
approved.69 Fifth, although we will not analyze the issue until Part III of this
essay, states have a variety of options for curing (or avoiding) internally
inconsistent tax regimes, including through their choices of source and
residence tax rates and via credit mechanisms.70
B. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which grants to
Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states and with the Indian tribes,”71 can be broken into three
separate but related clauses: the foreign Commerce Clause, the interstate
Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause.72 Each area describes
an affirmative grant of power to Congress. And each contains a
corresponding negative or dormant aspect.73 Among the three areas, the
dormant interstate Commerce Clause has received the most attention.
The Supreme Court has only considered a few cases implicating the
dormant foreign Commerce Clause.74 The Supreme Court (and lower courts)
analyze interstate and foreign dormant Commerce Clause cases similarly,75
69

See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a Maine law prohibiting the
importation of baitfish because Maine authorities could not be certain that the imported fish
would be noninvasive species that were free of parasites).
70
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1806. We address this issue at length infra Part III.
71
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72
For comprehensive discussion of the dormant Indian Commerce Clause, see
generally Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and
State Taxation, 63 TAX LAW. 897 (2010).
73
S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984) (“Although the
Commerce Clause is by its text an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce, the Clause has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on
the power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce”);
Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence
Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1160 (2003) (advocating a presumption of intrasentence
uniformity on the grounds that although the “phrase ‘regulate commerce’ clearly is capable of
conveying multiple meanings in the Commerce Clause, the presumption of intrasentence
uniformity wins out . . . because nothing in the Commerce Clause’s text or original
understanding actually suggests that the Founders understood ‘regulate commerce’ as having
multiple meanings” but also noting that “the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause applies
differently to each subpart,” with the dormant foreign Commerce Clause constraining states
more than the other subparts); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATE
RIGHTS: “BACK TO THE CONSTITUTION” 50 (1936) (advocating lock-step interpretation).
74
The most important of these cases is Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434 (1979). See also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 114 S. Ct.
2268 (1994); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993); Kraft Gen. Foods
v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 71 (1992); Wardair Canada v. Florida Dep’t of
Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159
(1983); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
75
See Michael A. Zuckerman, The Offshoring of American Government, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 165, 180 (2008) (“Lower courts borrow the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause
standard to adjudicate challenges to state regulation of foreign commerce because the Supreme
Court’s dormant Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence is relatively undeveloped.”). See
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and the Supreme Court has long made clear that the Constitution’s
prohibition against discriminatory taxes applies to both interstate and foreign
commerce.76 The Supreme Court interprets the dormant foreign Commerce
Clause to place more, not fewer, restrictions on state taxation than does the
dormant interstate Commerce Clause.77 Specifically, state laws must pass
two additional hurdles under the dormant foreign Commerce Clause that do
not apply under the dormant interstate Commerce Clause.78 The first
additional consideration is whether the challenged state tax creates “a
substantial risk of international multiple taxation.”79 This requirement arises
because — as compared with dormant interstate commerce cases — dormant
foreign commerce cases involve at least one more additional taxing
jurisdiction: the foreign country.80 Second, state taxation must not impair
federal uniformity in an area where it is essential that the federal government
“speak with one voice.”81
1.

Complete Auto Factors

In tax cases — and all of the cases in which the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause has played an important role are tax cases — the Supreme
Court applies the four-part Complete Auto test that it devised for interstate
commerce cases.82 None of these cases squarely addresses the issue of
whether the dormant interstate and foreign Commerce Clauses uphold the
same values. Instead, the Supreme Court simply has assumed or very briefly
concluded that the Complete Auto factors apply the same way to interstate
and foreign dormant Commerce Clause cases as a first step. Then, the Court

id. (citing Antilles Cement Corp. v. Acevedo Vila, 408 F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Although
the language of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence most often concerns interstate
commerce, essentially the same doctrine applies to international commerce.”).
76
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
77
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448 (“Although the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants
Congress power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several States’
in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign
commerce power to be the greater.”). Id. at 451 (“we believe that an inquiry more elaborate
than that mandated by Complete Auto is necessary when a State seeks to tax the
instrumentalities of foreign, rather than of interstate, commerce”); South–Central Timber
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) (“It is a well-accepted rule that State
restrictions burdening foreign commerce are subjected to a more rigorous and searching
scrutiny.”); Kraft Gen. Foods, 505 U.S. at 79 (“the constitutional prohibition against state
taxation of foreign commerce is broader than the protection afforded interstate commerce, in
part because matters of concern to the entire Nation are implicated”).
78
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447.
79
Id. at 451.
80
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298, 317 (1994).
81
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448.
82
See, e.g., id. at 445; Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169–71
(1983).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550746

372

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 39:3:357

goes on to add additional prongs to the Complete Auto test that apply
exclusively to foreign commerce cases.83
Although the Supreme Court has applied the Complete Auto test in both
interstate and foreign dormant Commerce Clause cases, there are reasons to
distinguish them.84 For example, the risks of economic balkanization within
the United States, a frequently cited concern in dormant interstate Commerce
Clause cases, are presumably less significant when states tax (or regulate)
foreign commerce.85 Likewise, some have argued that the nondiscrimination
principle is useful because it provides proxy representation for Americans
that lack voting entitlements in states where they do business, but do not
reside.86 But such arguments presumably do not carry as much weight when
83

See, e.g., Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445 (not specifically applying the internal
consistency test, but assuming the challenged tax satisfied the Complete Auto factors before
holding that it nevertheless created a substantial risk of multiple international tax and
prevented the federal government from speaking with one voice in international commerce);
Container, 463 U.S. at 169 (noting that state taxes that impact foreign commerce must satisfy
internally consistency, and, although it did not perform internal-consistency analysis on the
challenged California rule, it noted that the Court had previously upheld such apportionment
rules as internally consistent) (citing Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942)); id. at
170 (“Besides being fair, an apportionment formula must, under the Commerce Clause, also
not result in discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce.”); Barclays, 512 U.S. at
312 (applying internal consistency test to California’s apportionment formula that affected
foreign commerce; concluding that “‘if applied by every jurisdiction,’ California’s method
‘would result in no more than all of the unitary business’ income being taxed’”) (citing
Container, 463 U.S. at 169); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 73–74
(1990) (noting that because the taxpayer accepted the lower court’s conclusion that the
challenged tax satisfied the Complete Auto factors, it only had to consider the two additional
Japan Line factors, multiple tax and one voice); Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue
and Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 79–82 (1992) (not applying the internal consistency test, but holding
that a state’s inclusion in income of foreign, but not domestic, dividends facially discriminated
in violation of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause).
84
When faced with his first “occasion to consider an asserted application of the
negative Commerce Clause to commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ — as opposed to commerce
‘among several states’,” Justice Scalia concluded that “for reasons of stare decisis, I must
apply the same categorical prohibition against laws that facially discriminate against foreign
commerce as I do against laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce —
though it may be that the rule is not as deeply rooted in our precedents for the former field.”
Itel, 507 U.S. at 81 (Scalia, J., concurring). But Justice Scalia further concluded that “[a]s with
the Interstate Commerce Clause, however, stare decisis cannot bind me to a completely
indeterminate test such as the ‘four-factored test plus two’” that combines the Complete Auto
test with two additional factors from Japan Line. Id.
85
But see id. at 86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (expressing fear that allowing “states that
are constantly in need of new revenue to impose new taxes on [shipping] containers” would
result in “a patchwork of state taxes that will burden international commerce”).
86
Justice O’Connor regarded lack of political protections for foreign economic actors
to be an important element in interpreting the scope of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause.
In Barclays, she argued that the dormant foreign Commerce Clause only bars “double taxation
that (1) burdens a foreign corporation in need of protection for lack of access to the political
process, and (2) occurs ‘because [the State] does not conform to international practice.’”).
Barclays, 512 U.S. at 320 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). The majority in Barclays however, regarded the “battalion of foreign governments that
has marched to Barclays’ aid, deploring worldwide combined reporting in diplomatic notes,
amicus briefs, and even retaliatory legislation” as proof that foreign corporations did not need
political protection from the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. Since Barclays, the Supreme
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the disenfranchised parties are not Americans or even U.S. residents. Still,
the Supreme Court has not distinguished the two contexts, and the best
reading of current doctrine is that the nondiscrimination principle is the same
across both contexts. Specifically, in both contexts, the nondiscrimination
principle prevents protectionism. And because the internal consistency test
as a method can identify protectionism for interstate commerce as well as
foreign commerce, it makes sense for the Court to apply it in both foreign
and domestic commerce cases. The Court’s repeated application of the
Complete Auto factors — including the internal consistency test — in
dormant foreign Commerce Clause cases confirms this view.87 Later, we give
reasons favoring coextensive interpretation of the nondiscrimination
principle in both contexts.88
2.

Multiple Taxation

This Subpart discusses the first additional consideration — beyond the
Complete Auto factors — that applies in dormant foreign Commerce Clause
tax cases, namely, whether the challenged rule creates a substantial risk of
multiple international taxation. We explain that the Supreme Court’s position
on double international taxation under the dormant foreign Commerce
Clause context is unclear, reflecting the age of its dormant foreign Commerce
Clause decisions, the most recent of which dates to the mid-1990s.89
a.

Japan Line

In 1979, a unanimous Supreme Court decided Japan Line, Limited v.
County of Los Angeles, a case challenging a California tax on the value of
shipping containers.90 California imposed property tax on assets present in
California on the “lien date,” a particular day of each year.91 As applied to
containers used in interstate commerce, California argued that the tax was
well apportioned because the value of containers present in California on the
Court has moved away from the political-safeguards theory of the dormant Commerce Clause,
including by moving away from the dictum announced in Goldberg v. Sweet that the dormant
Commerce Clause should not apply to residents complaining about restriction or
discrimination imposed by their own states because those residents have recourse to political
solutions. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1798
(2015) (noting that the Court has “repudiated” the notion that the dormant Commerce Clause
does not apply to residents).
87
See references in supra note 83. Other questions, including for example, whether the
market participation exception to the dormant Commerce Clause applies to regulation of
foreign commerce, remain open. See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 66
(1st Cir. 1999) (“we believe that the risks inherent in state regulation of foreign commerce —
including the risk of retaliation against the nation as a whole and the weakening of the federal
government's ability to speak with one voice in foreign affairs, . . . weigh against extending
the market participation exception to the Foreign Commerce Clause”) (citations omitted).
88
See infra Part I.B.4.
89
See Barclays, 512 U.S. 298.
90
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
91
Id. at 437.
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lien date was representative.92 Six Japanese companies challenged the rule,
arguing that although the presence of their shipping containers on the lien
date was “fairly representative of the containers ‘average presence’ [in
California] during each year,”93 the imposition by California of any property
tax at all on containers owned by foreign companies and used in international
commerce violated the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. The Supreme
Court accepted the lower court’s factual conclusions that (1) under accepted
international practice, Japan did not tax the shipping containers of U.S.
companies when those containers were present in Japan,94 and (2) the
complaining Japanese companies in fact suffered unrelieved double tax
because Japan taxed the full value of all containers owned by its corporate
residents in addition to California taxing some of those containers.95
After assuming that the California tax passed the Complete Auto test,
including its fair apportionment requirement, the Supreme Court concluded
that “[w]hen construing Congress’ power ‘to regulate commerce with foreign
Nations,’ a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required.”96 Specifically,
when a State seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign commerce, two
additional considerations, beyond those articulated in Complete Auto, come
into play. The first is whether the state tax creates an “enhanced risk of
multiple taxation.”97 The second, which we will discuss later, is whether the
state undermines the federal government’s ability to speak with one voice.98
In the dormant interstate Commerce Clause context, the
nondiscrimination and fair apportionment prongs of the Complete Auto test
handle risks of double state taxation, and courts use the internal consistency
test to determine whether or not a state’s substantive tax rule or its
apportionment rule operate as functional tariffs on interstate commerce.99
Specifically, state taxes that are internally consistent with respect to the
taxation of interstate commerce are nondiscriminatory and fairly
apportioned.100 Although the Japan Line Court did not expressly apply the
internal consistency test, if it had, the Court would have found the California
tax regime to be internally consistent with respect to foreign commerce. If
92

Id.
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 436, 452 n. 17.
96
Id. at 446 (quoting the Constitution). Cf. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United States,
289 U.S. 48, 56–57 (1933) (“It is an essential attribute of the [foreign commerce] power that
it is exclusive and plenary. As an exclusive power, its exercise may not be limited, qualified
or impeded to any extent by state action.”).
97
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
98
See infra Part I.B.3.
99
Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29 (using the example of tax
rates); Knoll & Mason, How the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Should Apply Wynne,
78 TAX NOTES ST. 921 (2015) (using the example of apportionment formulas) [hereinafter
Knoll & Mason, Massachusetts].
100
See, e.g., Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (holding that a
state was free to adopt an apportionment formula that differed from the formula used by fortyfour of the forty-six states imposing an income tax).
93
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other jurisdictions adopted California’s rule, each container would be taxed
by only one tax jurisdiction, the one in which the container was physically
present on the lien date, and owners of shipping containers would never be
subject to double tax. Likewise, the tax was fairly apportioned, the
complaining taxpayers admitted that the number of their containers present
in California on the lien date was representative.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the California tax as applied
to instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as shipping containers
owned by Japanese companies and used in “oceangoing traffic,” violated the
dormant foreign Commerce Clause due to the risk of multiple taxation that
arose from the possibility that Japan would seek to tax the containers’ full
value.101 When California responded that it was Japan, not California, that
created the risk of multiple tax by assessing the whole value of the containers
to tax without apportionment, the Court responded that “California’s tax . . .
must be evaluated in the realistic framework of the custom of nations,”102
under which “Japan has the right and the power to tax appellants’ containers
at their full value; nothing could prevent it from doing so.”103
Thus, according to the Japan Line Court, even “fairly apportioned” taxes
that would not be considered discriminatory under the dormant interstate
Commerce Clause may violate the dormant foreign Commerce Clause.104
The Court distinguished interstate commerce by noting that when double
taxation arises from overlapping taxes by two or more U.S. states, the
Supreme Court has “the ability to enforce full apportionment by all potential
taxing bodies.”105 In contrast, “[i]f an instrumentality of commerce is
domiciled abroad, the country of domicile [Japan] may have the right,
consistently with the custom of nations, to impose a tax on . . . full value.”106
Indeed, the Court concluded that “California’s tax . . . creates more than the
risk of multiple taxation; it produces multiple taxation in fact.”107 The Court
distinguished Moorman,108 a case in which it upheld an unusual (by other
states’ standards) state apportionment formula, notwithstanding that the
unusual apportionment formula created a risk of double state taxation.109
According to the Japan Line Court, “[e]ven a slight overlapping of tax — a
problem that might be deemed de minimis in a domestic context — assumes

101

Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447, 449, 451.
Id. at 454.
103
Id.
104
Id. The Japan Line Court went to some effort to distinguish Moorman, reasoning that
the risk of multiple state taxation in Moorman was speculative, whereas the risk of multiple
international taxation in Japan Lines was certain. Id. at 455.
105
Id. at 447.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 452.
108
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
109
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 456. In Moorman, the challenged state used single-factorsales apportionment, whereas all other states at that time used three-factor (sales, property,
payroll) apportionment.
102
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importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations and national
sovereignty are concerned.”110
The Japan Line Court reasoned that because neither the Supreme Court
nor any other “authoritative tribunal” could mandate that foreign
jurisdictions use fractional apportionment rather than source-and-residence
rules, states faced additional restrictions on their ability to tax foreign
commerce that did not apply to restrict states’ ability to tax interstate
commerce.111 The Court regarded it as essential to its holding that the case
involved instrumentalities of interstate commerce.112
b.

Container and Barclays

The Supreme Court took a large step back from the far-reaching
implications of Japan Line in Container Corporation of America v.
Franchise Tax Board, a 5-3 decision that brought dormant foreign
Commerce Clause doctrine into much closer alignment with modern dormant
interstate Commerce Clause doctrine on the issue of double taxation.113
Container involved a challenge by a domestic company with foreign
operations to California’s worldwide unitary tax with formula
apportionment. Under its apportionment rule, California taxed a portion of
the company’s global unitary business income, as measured by its California
sales, payroll, and property compared to its global sales, payroll, and
property.114 Among other claims, the taxpayer argued that the California rule
violated the fair apportionment prong of Complete Auto and that the dormant
foreign Commerce Clause obliged California to use separate accounting and
110

Id. As in Japan Line, in Mobil Oil, the Supreme Court again emphasized its ability
to “correct” multiple taxation that arises from overlapping exercises of tax powers by states.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). Mobil Oil involved Vermont’s
ability to tax a nondomiciliary parent company on dividends comprised of foreign income.
Vermont included an apportionable share of those dividends in the parent’s income taxable in
Vermont. Id. at 429. Mobil Oil argued that such dividends should be allocated exclusively to
the parent’s domicile state, New York. Id. at 435, 444. Refusing to find a constitutional
preference for allocation over apportionment, the Court noted that even though apportionment
created a risk of multiple state taxation, the Court had the “power to correct any gross
overreaching” Id. at 446. Although Mobil Oil alleged a “discriminatory effect on foreign
commerce as a result of multiple state taxation,” the Court found that effect “just as detectible
and corrigible as a similar effect on commerce among the states. Accordingly, we see no
reason why the standard for identifying impermissible discrimination should differ in the two
instances.” Id. at 447.
111
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447. See id. at 455 (in this case “true apportionment does not
exist and cannot be policed by this Court at all”).
112
Id. at 444 (describing the question presented as “whether instrumentalities of
commerce that are owned, based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in
international commerce, may be subjected to apportioned ad valorem property taxation by a
State”). Id. at 446–47 (“In order to prevent multiple taxation of interstate commerce, this Court
has required that taxes be apportioned among taxing jurisdictions, so that no instrumentality
of commerce is subjected to more than one tax on its full value”).
113
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). (Justice Stevens
did not participate in the decision).
114
Id. at 163.
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the arm’s-length method to allocate income instead of formula
apportionment because separate accounting was both the federal rule and the
internationally accepted standard.
Following precedent in which it had already accepted formula
apportionment, and citing the internal consistency test, the Supreme Court
rejected the fair-apportionment claim.115 It noted that California’s “the threefactor [apportionment] formula is necessarily imperfect. But we have seen
no evidence demonstrating that the margin of error . . . is greater than [that]
. . . inherent in the sort of separate accounting urged upon us.”116 Noting that
“in the interstate commerce context, however, the anti-discrimination
principle has not in practice required much in addition to the requirement of
fair apportionment,” the Court confirmed that “a more searching inquiry is
necessary when we are confronted with the possibility of international double
taxation.”117 The Court acknowledged that Container was similar to Japan
Line. Both involved actual double taxation that stemmed from a divergence
in the allocation rules adopted by a U.S. state and a foreign government. And
in both cases, the foreign government’s allocation rule represented the
accepted international practice.118 Notwithstanding these similarities, the
Supreme Court distinguished Container from Japan Line, ultimately holding
that the California apportionment regime did not offend the Constitution.
First, the Court drew a distinction between the type of property taxes on
instrumentalities of interstate commerce at issue in Japan Line and the
income taxes at issue in Container, noting that “‘[t]he reasons for allocation
to a single situs that often apply in the case of property taxation carry little
force’ in the case of income taxation.”119 The implication was that it made
more sense for the Court to allocate the whole property tax base to Japan than
it would to allocate the whole income tax base to any one jurisdiction. The
Court has since abandoned sharp distinctions between types of taxes under
the nondiscrimination prong of dormant Commerce Clause analysis, so this
basis of distinction may not be relevant to modern cases.120
Second, the Court reasoned that whereas the California property tax
struck down in Japan Line led inevitably to double international taxation, the
apportionment rule challenged in Container did not. In Japan Line, collection
by California of any property tax on the shipping containers led to double
taxation because Japan, as the domicile state, taxed the containers in full.
And, since the Supreme Court had no authority to alter Japan’s taxation, the
115

Id. at 170 (citing Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942)). See id. at 181
(reasoning that separate accounting with arm’s-length was not the benchmark by which unfair
apportionment could be established).
116
Id. at 183–84.
117
Id. at 171. See id. at 185 (concluding that “we must subject this case to the additional
scrutiny required by the Foreign Commerce Clause”).
118
Id. at 187.
119
Id. at 188 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Department of Rev. of Wisconsin, 447 U.S. 207,
228–29 (1980)).
120
Cf. Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1796–97
(2015) (tracing the Court’s move away from formalism and towards economic substance in
evaluating state taxes).
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only way to avoid double taxation was to require California to forgo tax
entirely. Moreover, such forbearance would be effective in Japan Line: “the
taxing State could entirely eliminate one important source of double taxation
simply by adhering to one bright-line rule: do not tax, to any extent
whatsoever,” foreign-owned cargo containers used in international
commerce.121 The Court thought it was “by no means unfair” to require
California in Japan Line to forgo property taxation on shipping containers
owned by foreign companies, because such forbearance “did no more than
reflect consistent international practice and express federal policy.”122
In contrast, the Container Court held that, unlike the overlap between
the California and Japanese property tax regimes, the overlap between the
California apportionment regime and other countries’ separate accounting
regimes was not inevitable.123 And even if use by California and other
countries of “two distinct methods of allocating the income of a multinational enterprise”124 led to some overlap, the Court noted that forcing
California to switch to separate accounting might not cure the double tax,
since different states enforce separate accounting differently.125 Citing
Moorman, the Container Court concluded that it would be “perverse, simply
for the sake of avoiding double taxation, to require California to give up one
allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of
another allocation method that also sometimes results in double taxation.”126
Finally, the Court held that the solution imposed in Japan Line — complete
forbearance of property tax on foreign companies’ shipping containers —
was not appropriate in Container. According to the Court, preventing
California from assessing income taxation on a domestic company with
foreign operations involved “obvious unfairness [that] requires no
elaboration.”127
The Court also distinguished the cases two by observing that Container
involved the taxation of a domestic company, whereas Japan Line involved
the taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce owned by foreign
companies.128 The Court did not elaborate on this point, and partially
121

Container, 463 U.S. at 189.
Id. at 191.
123
Id. at 188 (“Whether the combination of the two methods results in the same income
being taxed twice or in some portion of income not being taxed at all is dependent solely on
the facts of the individual case.”); id. at 188–89 (multiple tax was not the “inevitable result”
of the California apportionment rule).
124
Id. at 188.
125
See id. at 191 (even “if California were to adopt some version of the arm’s-length
approach, it could not eliminate the risk of double taxation of corporations subject to its
franchise tax, and might in some cases end up subjecting those corporations to more serious
double taxation than would occur under formula apportionment”).
126
Id. at 192 (citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S., at 278–80). See also Barclays
Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 319 (1994) (forcing California to switch to the
world standard would not “dispositively lessen the risk of multiple taxation”).
127
Container, 463 U.S. at 190.
128
Id. at 189. See also id. at 187 n. 24 (“we deliberately emphasized in Japan Lines the
narrowness of the question presented: ‘whether instrumentalities of commerce that are owned,
122
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abandoned it eleven years later in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board, a case in which the Court upheld application of California’s
worldwide apportionment rule to a foreign-parented multinational.129
In a dissent in Container joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O’Connor, Justice Powell concluded that the California apportionment rule
violated both of the additional dormant foreign Commerce Clause factors
announced under Japan Line. Among other reasons for his dissent, Justice
Powell cited that the California regime not only created a risk of multiple
international taxation, it “resulted in actual double taxation.”130 When other
countries used separate accounting, the California regime would lead to
double tax whenever California had a larger share of the unitary business’s
factors than did other countries.131 Moreover, despite the majority’s claims
to the contrary, Justice Powell noted that there did indeed exist a method by
which California could prevent the risk of multiple international taxation
without having to switch to separate accounting. Specifically, California
could apportion only the company’s federal income, rather than its
worldwide income.132
c.

Other Cases

Other taxes survived judicial review under the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause, notwithstanding that they involved actual, or at least
potential, double tax. For example, decided in 1980, Mobil Oil Corporation
v. Commissioner of Taxes involved Vermont’s inclusion in its tax base via
formulary apportionment of a portion of dividends Mobil received from its
foreign subsidiaries. Vermont reasoned that such dividends from foreign
subsidiaries constituted part of the company’s unitary business and were
therefore taxable by formulary apportionment.133 Mobil argued that the
dormant foreign Commerce Clause should completely preclude Vermont
from taxing such dividends because they should be allocated exclusively to
New York, the company’s state of domicile.134 Thus, although Mobil Oil
involved foreign-source income, it was really a case about risks of double

based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in international commerce, may be
subjected to apportioned ad valorem property taxation by a State’”).
129
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
130
Container, 463 U.S. at 198 (Powell, J., dissenting).
131
Id. at 200 (Powell, J., dissenting).
132
Id. at 198 n. 1. (Powell, J., dissenting). Shortly thereafter, California succumbed to
political pressure and provided an election to limit unitary reporting to “the United States’
‘water’s edge,’” meaning companies could limit the unitary income calculation only to
companies whose presence in the United States “surpasses a certain threshold.” Barclays, 512
U.S. at 306.
133
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). The case also implicated
the taxation of dividends paid by U.S. companies domiciled outside Vermont. We do not
address this part of the claim, except to note that the Court held that the dormant Commerce
Clause did not preclude Vermont from taxing an apportionable share of these dividends.
134
The taxpayer argued that “dividends from a ‘foreign source’ by their very nature are
not apportionable income.” Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 435.
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U.S.-state taxation, not double international taxation. Although Mobil Oil
claimed that all the foreign dividends were apportionable only to New York,
New York did not include them, so the case also did not involve actual double
taxation.135 Unwilling to “establish a theoretical constitutional preference”
for taxation by a “single situs “ over “[t]axation by apportionment,”136 the
Supreme Court, by a 6-1 majority, upheld Vermont’s tax on the apportioned
dividends. The Mobil Oil Court distinguished Japan Line on grounds that in
this case, the Court possessed the “power . . . to correct excessive taxation”
that might arise from overlaps between the apportionment rules of New York
and Vermont.137
In 1993, in Itel Containers International Corporation v. Huddleston, the
taxpayer complained that Tennessee’s imposition of sales tax on leases of
shipping containers that traveled in international commerce and were
delivered to Tennessee violated the dormant foreign Commerce Clause.138
Itel argued that although no other countries actually imposed duplicative
sales taxes on the leases, Tennessee “invites multiple taxation of container
leases because numerous foreign nations have a sufficient taxing nexus with
the leases to impose equivalent taxes.”139 The Court rejected this argument
because “the foreign commerce clause cannot be interpreted to demand that
a State refrain from taxing any business transaction that is also potentially
subject to taxation by a foreign sovereign.”140 The Court also noted that the
relevant transactions took place in Tennessee, and that Tennessee “reduces,
if not eliminates, the risk of multiple international taxation” by crediting
other jurisdictions’ sales taxes on the leases, including foreign taxes.141
d.

Summary of the “Risk of Multiple Taxation” Prohibition

The Supreme Court has only once, in Japan Line, applied the “risk of
multiple international tax” doctrine to strike down a state tax under the
dormant foreign Commerce Clause. Although the Court did not expressly
consider the internal consistency of the California tax at issue in Japan Line,
as we explained above, the tax was internally consistent. That said, since
Japan Line, the Supreme Court has never struck down under the dormant
foreign Commerce Clause a tax rule that was internally consistent, even when
the challenged rule led to multiple international tax, as it did in Container
and Barclays.
Moreover, although not a dormant foreign Commerce Clause case, in
2015 Wynne raised new doubts about whether Japan Line’s substantial-riskof-multiple-international-tax doctrine survives. The Wynne Court made it
135

Id. at 444.
Id. at 444; id. at 445 (“we find no adequate justification for such a preference”).
137
Id. at 447; id. at 448 (also noting that Japan Line involved tax on instrumentalities of
interstate commerce).
138
Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1990).
139
Id. at 74.
140
Id.
141
Id.
136

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550746

2020]

The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause

381

clear that although the dormant Commerce Clause forbids discriminatory
double taxation, it does not forbid nondiscriminatory double taxation.142 The
distinction between the two is that discriminatory double tax is internally
inconsistent.143 This holding makes sense because double taxation that arises
from the mismatched, but internally consistent tax rules of different
jurisdictions does not have protectionist effects, whereas double taxation that
arises from an internally inconsistent rule imposed by a single jurisdiction
does have protectionist effects.144 The Court has not expressly endorsed the
Wynne view in the dormant foreign Commerce Clause context. It did,
however, in Container and Barclays, twice uphold an internally consistent
state tax regime that led to actual multiple international taxation. The
multiple international taxation in Container and Barclays arose from
mismatches between California’s apportionment rule and other states’
separate accounting rules. Although these mismatches resulted in double
taxation, the double tax did not have protectionist effects because the
challenged California rule was internally consistent.145 Thus, if the dormant
Commerce Clause prevents protectionism, the Court’s decisions upholding
the California worldwide apportionment regime in Container and Barclays
were correct. The same analysis applies to the sales tax on container leases
upheld in Itel. Specifically, as long as Tennessee’s sales tax was internally
consistent, it was not protectionist.146
While subsequent cases including Container, Barclays, Itel, and Wynne
suggest that internally consistent taxes do not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Court has never overruled Japan Line, and it has continued to cite
it.147 Also unclear is the impact of a dominant international tax practice on
the obligations of the states under the dormant foreign Commerce Clause.
The Japan Line Court based its decision that California created an
impermissible risk of multiple international taxation at least in part on the
fact that Japan followed international practice in taxing the full value of
containers owned by its residents, whereas California deviated from that
practice. On the other hand, California’s deviation from the near-universal
international practice of taxing income via separate accounting and arm’s-

142

Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1804 (2015)
(observing the “critical distinction . . . between discriminatory tax schemes and double
taxation that results only from the interaction of two different but nondiscriminatory tax
schemes”). For more on the differences between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory double
taxation, see Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29.
143
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802.
144
See Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at 326–29 (explaining
that internally consistent taxes are not protectionist, even when they result in double tax).
145
For more on the relationship between apportionment rules, discrimination, and
internal consistency, see Knoll & Mason, Massachusetts, supra note 99.
146
We do not know the details of Tennessee’s regime, but the Court noted that it credited
other countries’ taxes, which strongly suggests internal consistency.
147
See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 318–22 (1994) (citing
the Japan Line factors, but holding that the state satisfied both of them). See also Wardair
Canada v. Florida Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986) (“there is no threat of multiple
international taxation in this case”).
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length did not create an unacceptable risk of multiple tax in Container or
Barclays, where a majority of the Court observed that “we cannot agree that
‘international practice’ has such force as to dictate this Court’s Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.”148
3.

Undermining Federal Ability to “Speak with One Voice”

The other additional dormant foreign Commerce Clause requirement,
which the Court also announced in Japan Line, is that states must not “impair
federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.”149 States
thus must not “prevent this Nation from ‘speaking with one voice’ in
regulating foreign commerce.”150 The cases do not present a clear picture of
when states violate the “one voice” requirement.
a.

Deviation from International Practice

One relevant, but not dispositive factor in whether a state violates the
one-voice requirement is whether the state tax practice matches international
tax practice. In Japan Line, the Court pointed to the Customs Convention on
Containers, a treaty signed by the United States and Japan, among others,
that required that shipping containers “temporarily imported are admitted
free of ‘all duties and taxes whatsoever chargeable by reason of
importation.’”151 Although the treaty did not appear to expressly bar the
California tax because it was not an import tax,152 the Court concluded that
treaty “reflect[ed] a national policy to remove impediments to the use of
containers as ‘instruments of international traffic.’”153
In Japan Line, the Court accepted that it was international practice for
states to assess property taxes on the full value of shipping containers owned
by their residents. Thus, California’s variant policy of taxing shipping
containers of all companies on an apportioned basis — whether resident or
not — deviated from international practice, which risked triggering
“international disputes over reconciling apportionment formulae.”154 The
California property-tax rule therefore violated the federal uniformity
requirement of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause.155 But, as discussed
148

Barclays, 512 U.S. at 320.
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). See also id.
(“‘In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the
United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.’”)
(quoting Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933)). As the Tenth
Circuit put it, the dormant foreign Commerce Clause “is a restriction on the States. It silences
them so that only the voice of the national government is heard on international matters.”
United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2018).
150
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.
151
Id. at 452–53.
152
The Court did not make a finding on this issue. Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 450.
155
Id. at 453.
149
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above, in Container and Barclays, the Court declined to impose the
international practice156 of apportioning income via separate accounting and
arm’s-length transfer pricing on California because doing so would not
necessarily eliminate (or even lessen) double taxation.157
b.

Risk of Retaliation

In Japan Line, the Court also supported the “one-voice” doctrine by
noting that there was an “acute” risk that Japan would retaliate for
California’s deviant (by world standards) property tax rule and such
retaliation “would be felt by the Nation as a whole,” not just California.158
But in Container, the Court emphasized its own lack of institutional
competence in determining “precisely when foreign nations will be offended
by particular act”159 or when they might retaliate.160 Moreover, even when
presented with clear evidence of international opposition and threats of
retaliation in Barclays, the Supreme Court still held that California’s
apportionment rule did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because
“Congress, not ‘international practice’ holds the reins” when it comes to the
Commerce Clause.161 The Supreme Court furthermore concluded that
“Barclays’ and its amici’s argument that California’s worldwide combined
reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it is likely to provoke
retaliatory action by foreign governments is directed to the wrong forum. The
judiciary is not vested with power to decide ‘how to balance a particular risk
of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let
the States tax as they please.’”162

156

See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 305 (1994) (“The
corporate income tax imposed by the United States employs a ‘separate accounting’ method,
a means of apportioning income among taxing sovereigns used by all major developed
nations.”).
157
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 192 (1983). In contrast, Justice
O’Connor would have held that state taxes violate the dormant foreign Commerce Clause
when they create a risk of multiple tax that arises from the state’s use of a standard or rule that
differs from “accepted international practice.” Barclays, 512 U.S. at 335 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
158
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453 (the “risk of retaliation by Japan . . . would be felt by the
Nation as a whole).”
159
Container, 463 U.S. at 194.
160
Id. The Container Court also gave reasons why it thought retaliation was not likely
in the case of the California apportionment regime, including that it did not inevitably result
in double taxation. Id. at 195.
161
See, e.g., Barclays, 512 U.S. at 320 (describing a “battalion of foreign governments
that has marched to Barclays’ aid deploring worldwide combined reporting in diplomatic
notes, amicus briefs, and even retaliatory legislation”). See id. (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing diplomatic notices to the effect that “[m]ost
of the United States’ trading partners have objected to California’s use of worldwide combined
reporting”).
162
Id. at 327–28 (quoting Container, 463 U.S. at 194).
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Deviation from Federal Practice

Another issue in these cases is whether to avoid violating the one-voice
requirement states must adopt the same substantive tax policies as the federal
government when those policies touch on foreign commerce. For example,
one question in Container was whether the dormant foreign Commerce
Clause required California to adopt the same apportionment rule as the
federal government, namely separate accounting with arm’s-length transfer
pricing. The Supreme Court held that federal-state tax base conformity was
not required,163 noting that “if a state tax merely has foreign resonances, but
does not implicate foreign affairs, we cannot infer, ‘[a]bsent some explicit
directive from Congress, . . . that treatment of foreign income at the federal
level mandates identical treatment by the States.’”164
d.

Discerning Federal Policy

Under Japan Line, a state may not “impair federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential”165 nor “prevent this Nation from
‘speaking with one voice’ in regulating foreign commerce.”166 In Container,
the Court limited the Japan Line doctrine, stating that it would not overturn
a state tax that “merely has foreign resonances, but does not implicate foreign
affairs.” This requirement leads to significant open questions. For example,
when is federal uniformity essential? When does a state interfere with the
federal government’s ability to speak with one voice? How can courts
distinguish taxes with mere foreign resonances, from those that implicate
foreign affairs?167 And to the extent that any of these questions turn on a
court’s ability to discern federal policy (as something other than federal law),
how should it do so?168
In Japan Line, the Court concluded that by imposing a well-apportioned
163

For more on tax-base conformity, see Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity
with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J. 1267 (2013).
164
Container, 463 U.S. at 194 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425, 448 (1980)). Cf. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 448 (“Absent some explicit directive from
Congress, we cannot infer that treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates
identical treatment by the states. The absence of any explicit directive to that effect is attested
by the fact that Congress has long debated, but has not exacted, legislation designed to regulate
state taxation of income.”
165
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979).
166
Id. at 451.
167
Ryan Baasch & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Congress and the Reconstruction of
Foreign Affairs Federalism, 115 MICH. L. REV. 47, 64 (2016) (noting elusive dichotomy
between laws that have foreign resonances and those that implicate foreign affairs).
168
See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784
(2008) (tracing historical approaches to whether prohibitions of certain legislative purposes
were judicially enforceable and evolving methods adopted by the judiciary to discern
legislative purpose, including in the dormant Commerce Clause context). See also Scott
Sullivan, The Future of the Foreign Commerce Clause, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1989
(2015) (advocating against finding state action barred under the dormant foreign Commerce
Clause in the absence of a clear federal statement).
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tax on foreign-owned shipping containers, California interfered with the
federal government’s ability to speak with one voice. It based this conclusion
on several grounds. First, it understood the United States’ participation in the
Customs Convention on Containers, a treaty that prohibited import taxes on
shipping containers, “to reflect[] a national policy to remove impediments to
the use of containers as ‘instruments of international traffic.”169 Although the
Court did not find that the Convention by its terms barred the challenged
California property tax,170 the Court nevertheless held that by taxing shipping
containers at all California “frustrate[d] attainment of federal uniformity”171
and thereby violated the dormant foreign Commerce Clause’s one-voice
requirement.
But on the basis of similar types evidence, the Supreme Court in later
cases found that a state did not interfere with federal policy. For example, in
1986 in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue,172 the Supreme
Court considered whether a sales tax on aviation fuel violated the dormant
foreign Commerce Clause when Florida imposed it on all fuel purchased in
the state, including fuel used exclusively for international flights. The
challenging taxpayer conceded that the tax satisfied Complete Auto and that
it created no risk of multiple international taxation.173 The only remaining
dormant foreign Commerce Clause question was whether the tax prevented
the federal government from speaking with one voice.
The Wardair Court confirmed that the national uniformity requirement
announced in Japan Line was concerned “not with an actual conflict between
state and federal law, but rather with the policy of uniformity, embodied in
the Commerce Clause, which presumptively prevails when the Federal
Government remains silent.”174 The taxpayer argued that the state sales tax
threatened “a federal policy” of reciprocal tax exemptions on aviation fuel
and similar goods and services related to international air traffic.175 But the
Supreme Court disagreed, arguing that not only was there no evidence for
such a policy, but that by entering into various agreements that limited the
federal, but not state, entitlement to tax aviation fuel, the federal government
had essentially announced a policy not to restrict such state taxes.
The taxpayer, supported by the United States as amicus curiae, argued
that a federal policy opposing any taxation of aviation fuel could be derived
from a combination of several sources, namely a multilateral treaty under
which the United States and 156 partners agreed not to impose certain
169

Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453. In favor of the proposition that there was a national
policy to remove impediments to such use of containers, the Court also cited 19 U.S.C. §
1322(a), a federal law that grants the Treasury Secretary authority to exempt instruments of
international traffic from customs laws. Id.
170
Property taxes are not, without more, import duties, and so presumably would not be
barred by the Customs Convention on Containers.
171
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453.
172
Wardair Canada v. Florida Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
173
Id. at 8–9.
174
Id. at 8.
175
Id. at 9.
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national fuel taxes; a resolution adopted by the International Civil Aviation
Organization, of which the United States was a member, that endorsed fuel
tax exemptions; and 70 bilateral aviation agreements under which the United
States agreed not to impose national fuel taxes.
In a decision joined by seven justices,176 the Court held that these sources
did not amount to evidence of a coherent federal policy to forbid state air fuel
taxes. On the contrary, federal law and several of the cited sources expressly
permitted the type of subnational fuel tax at issue in the case, even as they
forbade certain national and other subnational fuel taxes.177 Moreover,
regarding the International Civil Aviation Organization resolution, the Court
noted that it was not “signed, entered into, agreed upon, approved, or passed
by either the Executive or Legislative branch of the Federal government.”178
As such, it represented not a policy of the United States, but merely the policy
of an organization of which the United States was a member.179 Thus, the
Court concluded that the federal government came closer to consenting to the
challenged tax than it did to forbidding it; in the Court’s view, “the Federal
Government has affirmatively decided to permit the States to impose these
sales taxes.”180
Justice Blackmun dissented in Wardair, concluding that if the regulated
area was one that necessitates a uniform national rule, then the dormant
foreign Commerce Clause applies to prevent state action unless the “intent
of the Federal Government to permit state activity [is] ‘unmistakably
clear.’”181 Not only was a federal intention to allow state taxation of airline
fuel not unmistakably clear, but “[t]he Government’s efforts in the
international sphere reveal an overarching and coherent policy directed at the
creation of reciprocal tax exemptions in the area of foreign aviation.”182
Although the federal government “stopped short of explicitly banning state
levies on aircraft fuel used in foreign travel, the indisputable pattern that
emerges is one of a policy of reciprocal tax exemptions for instrumentalities
of international commerce, like the containers in Japan Line or the fuel at

176

Chief Justice Burger joined in the judgment, but he concluded that federal law
expressly permitting the tax was sufficient to dispose of the dormant foreign Commerce
Clause inquiry; the Court need not have consulted international agreements. See id. at 17
(Burger, C.J, concurring) (“Just as we need not look beyond the plain language ‘when a federal
statute unambiguously forbids the States to impose a particular kind of tax on an industry
affecting interstate commerce,’ we need not look beyond the plain language of a federal statute
which unambiguously authorizes the States to impose a particular kind of tax.”) (quoting
Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 12 (1983)) (emphasis in original).
177
Id. at 11–12.
178
Id. at 11.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 12 (“It would turn dormant Commerce Clause analysis entirely upside down to
apply it where the Federal Government has acted, and to apply it in such a way as to reverse
the policy that the Federal Government has elected to follow.”).
181
Id. at 18–19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting South-Central Timber Development,
Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984)).
182
Id. at 19.
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issue here.”183 Justice Blackmun argued that Florida’s tax could inspire
retaliation by other countries and hamper U.S. negotiations with them.184
Adding further doubts about the scope of the one-voice requirement, the
Supreme Court found no violation when it twice considered the
constitutionality of California’s worldwide formula apportionment regime.
In Container, the Court noted that the solicitor general had not filed an
amicus brief in the case,185 nor had the federal government taken the
opportunity to bind states to the arm’s-length method in its tax treaties.186
Although the Court expressly acknowledged that an amicus brief from the
United States could not be dispositive, the Court concluded that the
California apportionment rule was not “preempted by federal law or fatally
inconsistent with federal policy.”187 When the same California regime was
challenged again eleven years later in Barclays, the Court noted that in cases
involving “otherwise constitutional” taxes, “Congress may more passively
indicate that certain state practices do not ‘impair federal uniformity in an
area where federal uniformity is essential’; it need not convey its intent with
the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that discriminates
against interstate commerce or otherwise falls short under Complete Auto
inspection.”188 Thus, although Congress must expressly consent to taxes that
violate Complete Auto (for example, because they are discriminatory), the
Supreme Court will uphold “otherwise constitutional” taxes under the onevoice doctrine provided that Congress has at least “passively” indicated that
such practices do not impair federal uniformity.189
Because the California apportionment rule challenged in Barclays was
otherwise constitutional, the Supreme Court sought “’specific indication of
congressional intent’ to bar the state action.”190 It noted that although eleven
years had passed since the Supreme Court had approved California’s regime
in Container, Congress had not preempted the rule, even though Congress
had considered bills to require states to use arm’s-length allocation rules.191
Nor had the federal government bound states to the arm’s-length method in
its tax treaties; indeed, when the executive negotiated a tax treaty with the
United Kingdom that would have prevented California from applying its
worldwide apportionment regime to companies resident in the United
183

Id.
Id. at 20.
185
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196–97 (1983). See also Itel
Containers Int’l Corp. v Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75 (1990) (noting, but declaring not
dispositive, that the United States had filed an amicus brief defending the challenged state’s
law in part because it did “not interfere with our ability to ‘speak with one voice’”).
186
Container, 463 U.S. at 197.
187
Id. at 197.
188
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 323 (1994) (emphasis added
and citations omitted). See id. (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) (requiring an
“unambiguous indication of congressional intent” to insulate “otherwise invalid state
legislation” from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny).
189
Barclays, 512 U.S. at 323.
190
Id. at 324.
191
Id. at 325.
184
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Kingdom, the Senate only ratified it subject to a reservation reading the
relevant provision out of the treaty.192 The Supreme Court took such evidence
as “indicia of Congress’s willingness to tolerate worldwide combined
reporting mandates, even when those mandates are applied to foreign
corporations.”193 Moreover, the Court concluded that executive branch
statements, including an amicus brief in Barclays filed by the U.S. Solicitor
General arguing that California interfered with the federal government’s
ability to speak with one voice, were not dispositive. The Court gave two
reasons for upholding the California apportionment rule despite executive
branch communications that opposed it. First, the commerce power belongs
to Congress, not the executive; second, there was ample evidence from
Congress’s failure to explicitly preempt the California practice that it did not
intend to preclude it.194
Other than in Japan Line, the Supreme Court has not struck down any
other state taxes for violating the one-voice requirement under the dormant
foreign Commerce Clause. Indeed, when the Supreme Court considered
another case that involved taxes on shipping containers in 1993, Itel, it
rejected the notion that Tennessee’s sales tax, as applied to leases of shipping
containers used in both foreign and domestic commerce, impeded federal
objectives. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on the exact
same Customs Convention on Containers from Japan Line, but this time, the
Court used it to draw the opposite inference. Because the federal government
in the Convention and in other statutes had expressly restricted states’ ability
to tax only in certain “defined circumstances”195 that did not include the type
of sales tax on shipping containers challenged in Itel, the Court concluded
that the federal government implicitly intended to permit such taxation.196
e.

Summary of the “One-Voice” Requirement

Unlike the “risk of multiple international tax” requirement in Japan
Line, which we find to be redundant with the discrimination and fair
apportionment prongs of Complete Auto, the “one-voice” requirement seems

192

Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.
194
Id. at 328; id. at 329–30 (“The Executive Branch actions press releases, letters, and
amicus briefs on which [the taxpayer] here relies are merely precatory. Executive Branch
communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render
unconstitutional California’s otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide
combined reporting”).
195
Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75 (1990).
196
Id. at 76 (citing “strong indications from Congress that Tennessee’s method of
taxation is allowable”). In a part of its decision considering whether the Tennessee tax was
federally preempted, the Court noted that “federal regulatory scheme for containers used in
foreign commerce discloses no congressional intent to exempt those containers from all or
most domestic taxation”). Id. at 70. The Itel Court also noted that the United States Solicitor
General filed an amicus brief in support of the Tennessee tax, although that brief was “by no
means dispositive.” Id. at 75. Itel was decided before the Court’s criticism in Barclays of using
executive branch briefs to establish federal commerce policy.
193
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to add a genuinely different (and at first glance sensible) requirement in
foreign commerce cases that does not apply in interstate cases. But the
Supreme Court has only invoked it once, in Japan Line, to strike down a state
tax. Moreover, it would appear to apply to only a small set of cases. First,
where state taxes fail to comply with Complete Auto, they are
unconstitutional for that reason, and the Court would presumably not reach
the one-voice question. Second, if the tax would pass Complete Auto, but
overtly conflicts with federal policy regarding foreign commerce, it
presumably would be preempted without the need to invoke Japan Line.197
In contrast, where state taxes are “otherwise constitutional” because they
pass Complete Auto (and whatever may remain of Japan Line’s multiple
international tax test) and do not overtly conflict with federal law, the onevoice requirement as narrowed by Barclays and Itel suggests the Court will
find them to be “passively” approved by Congress.198
So what is left of the “one-voice” requirement? And if it is to be
resuscitated, how would courts ascertain the need for federal uniformity in
the absence of an enacted law, treaty, or other legislative action involving
both the legislative and executive branches? The Court has not provided any
answers to these and other questions raised by the one-voice requirement and
none are readily apparent to us. We are not alone in wondering about the
scope of the one-voice requirement. Justice Scalia argued that “no state can
ever actually ‘prevent this Nation from ‘speaking with one voice’ in
regulating foreign commerce”199 because the “National Government can
always explicitly pre-empt the offending state law.”200 He also noted that the
one-voice doctrine was indeterminate — it resulted in striking down the
property tax on shipping containers in Japan Line, but it did not disturb an
income tax on the proceeds of shipping container leases in Itel.201 In
Barclays, Justice Scalia noted that the majority’s decision “requires no more
than legislative inaction to establish that ‘Congress implicitly has permitted’
the States to impose a particular restriction on foreign commerce,”202
suggesting that the one-voice requirement does little additional work. Justice
O’Connor, dissenting in part from the judgment in Barclays, similarly

197

See Leanne M. Wilson, The Fate of Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause after
Garamendi and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 746 (2007) (arguing that cases resolved under
the dormant foreign Commerce Clause would be better handled under preemption analysis).
The problem with Wilson’s approach is that it would leave a gap in cases where Congress has
not spoken. In such cases, the dormant foreign Commerce Clause remains relevant. See
generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000).
198
Barclays, 512 U.S. at 323.
199
Itel, 507 U.S. at 80 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Japan Line).
200
Id. at 80–81.
201
Id. at 81 (Scalia, J., concurring). See id. at 85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (concluding
that the income tax on shipping container leases was unconstitutional because it interfered
with the federal government’s ability to speak with one voice). Id. (noting that although
Congress may authorize state regulation that otherwise would violate the Commerce Clause,
“the President may not authorize such regulation by the filing of an amicus brief”).
202
Barclays, 512 U.S. at 332 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion).
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complained that “the Legislature has neither approved nor disapproved the
California tax.”203
4.

Discrimination Under the Two Clauses

The continued relevance of the two additional Japan Line factors is an
open question. What is clear, however, is that the dormant aspects of both the
interstate and foreign Commerce Clauses require states, at a minimum, to
comply with the Complete Auto test.204 The gravamen of tax cases under
Complete Auto is typically discrimination. Thus, it is important to understand
whether the conceptions of discrimination differ under the interstate and
foreign versions of the clause. The nondiscrimination requirement prevents
states from preferring in-state205 or U.S. commerce206 to international
commerce.
Although the Supreme Court has not considered the question at any
length, if the main values underlying the dormant Commerce Clause’s
nondiscrimination principle are anti-protectionism and anti-retentionism, as
we and others have argued,207 then it would make sense to apply the same
nondiscrimination standard to cases implicating interstate and foreign
commerce.208 For example, because of the bi-directional impact of
protectionist taxes, taxes that protect a state’s economy from foreign
competition are also retentionist; a state that discriminates against foreigners’
in-state economic activity necessarily also discourages its own residents from
earning foreign income. Thus, whereas the case for preventing states from
203

Id. at 334.
See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979) (using
the Complete Auto test to evaluate a state tax under the dormant foreign Commerce Clause).
205
Id.
206
Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (holding
that Iowa could not favor commerce conducted in other U.S. states over foreign commerce);
id. (“a State’s preference for domestic commerce over foreign commerce is inconsistent with
the Commerce Clause even if the State’s own economy is not a direct beneficiary of the
discrimination.”); id. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Iowa . . . does not favor subsidiaries
incorporated in Iowa over foreign subsidiaries, but . . . does favor subsidiaries incorporated in
other States over foreign subsidiaries.”).
207
See generally references cited supra note 29. See, e.g., Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v
Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 73–74 (1990) (noting in a dormant foreign Commerce Clause case
that a tax satisfies “all four aspects of the Complete Auto test confirms both the State’s
legitimate interest in taxing the transaction and the absence of an attempt to interfere with the
free flow of commerce, be it foreign or domestic”).
208
See Wardair Canada v. Florida Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (“In cases
involving the so-called dormant Commerce Clause, both interstate and foreign . . . [, the]
‘words of the Commerce Clause . . . reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an
immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to
succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization
that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles
of Confederation’”) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–326, (1979)). See also
Barclays, 512 U.S. at 310 (the Commerce Clause “has long been understood . . . to provide
‘protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce [even] where Congress
has not acted . . . .’”) (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)).
204
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discriminating against foreigners may seem less compelling than the case for
preventing states from discriminating against residents of other states, both
kinds of discrimination are retentionist. That is, both kinds of discrimination
harm state residents, not only as consumers, but also as producers.
An implication of interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause to prohibit
protectionism in the foreign commerce context is that states may not restrict
their own residents’ opportunities to engage in foreign commerce, just as they
may not restrict their residents’ opportunities to engage in interstate
commerce.209 Consistent with this idea, the Supreme Court in Kraft General
Foods v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance struck down a facially
discriminatory rule under which Iowa allowed deductions to residents for
dividends received from domestic, but not foreign, subsidiaries.210 The notion
that the dormant foreign Commerce Clause, like the dormant interstate
Commerce Clause, applies to protect international commerce conducted not
only by foreigners, but also by state residents, is important for cases like
Steiner, which involve challenges brought by residents against their own
state. Notwithstanding that discrimination against foreign commerce affects
not only foreigners, but also Americans, the case for prohibiting
discrimination against foreign commerce still seems less compelling than
that for prohibiting discrimination against interstate commerce because, on
the inbound side, foreigners, rather than residents of fellow U.S. states,
benefit.
Interpreting both the interstate and foreign Commerce Clauses to
prevent protectionism means that, as the Supreme Court has done, lower
courts also would use the internal consistency test in both types of cases.211
As with interstate commerce, discrimination against foreign commerce can
be justified by a “compelling justification,”212 such as a “serious health and
safety concern”213 that cannot be addressed by less discriminatory measures.
214
The Court has not considered many justifications for tax discrimination,
but it has ruled that the administrative convenience to states of conforming
with the federal corporate tax base cannot justify facial discrimination against
foreign commerce.215 As with the dormant interstate Commerce Clause,

209

Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29 (arguing that protectionism
and retentionism are two sides of the same coin; protectionist taxes are necessarily retentionist,
and vice versa). See also Mason & Knoll, supra note 47, at 1057–71 (making the bi-directional
argument).
210
Kraft Gen. Foods, 505 U.S. 71.
211
For cases in which the Supreme Court stated that the Complete Auto factors,
including internal consistency as a test of nondiscrimination and fair apportionment, are
relevant under the dormant foreign Commerce Clause, see supra note 83.
212
Kraft Gen. Foods, 505 U.S. at 81.
213
Id. at 82.
214
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (holding that a U.S. state did not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause when it banned importation of baitfish from other states, since the
ban protecting native fisheries from parasitic infection and adulteration by non-native species,
goals that could not be accomplished by less discriminatory means).
215
Kraft Gen. Foods, 505 U.S. at 82.
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Congress can expressly consent to violations of the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause.
C. Continued Relevance of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Before moving on to consider the facts of Steiner, we briefly address a
controversy surrounding dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The dormant
Commerce Clause has many fans with widely divergent political views, but
it also has many critics,216 including Justice Clarence Thomas, who has
clearly and consistently announced that he will not apply the doctrine.217
Despite criticism, however, the dormant Commerce Clause not only remains
good law, but has the solid support of a large majority of the current Court.
1.

Atextualism

A mere seven weeks before the Utah Supreme Court decided Steiner,
the U.S. Supreme Court issued its most recent dormant Commerce Clause
opinion. The case, Tennessee Wine & Spirit Retailers Association v.
Thomas,218 involved a Tennessee law that imposed strict period-of-residence
requirements for liquor licenses.219 When a local trade group brought suit to
demand that the Tennessee Alcohol and Beverage Commission enforce part
of the residence requirement, the dispute ultimately reached the Supreme
Court.220
216

See Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015)
(recounting criticism by Justices Thomas and Scalia); id. at 1806 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(referring to the dormant Commerce Clause as “a judicial fraud”). See generally Regan, supra
note 29 (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause should be limited to preventing
intentional discrimination). Many prominent academics and jurists (with widely divergent
political views) are proponents of a robust dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See Wynne,
135 S. Ct. at 1794 (discussing the doctrine’s “deep roots”). See also Brannon P. Denning,
Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417
(2008); and Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29.
217
See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (”the negative
Commerce Clause . . . cannot serve as a basis for striking down a statute.”)
218
Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
219
For example, in order to obtain an initial license to own or operate a liquor store, an
individual had to reside in Tennessee for the two previous years. To renew the license —
which Tennessee required after only one year of operation — an individual had to show
continuous residency in Tennessee for 10 years. Id. at 2457 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3204(b)(2)(A) (2014)). For a corporation to receive a liquor license, all of its officers, directors
and shareholders had to satisfy the two-year residence requirement. Id. at 2457 (citing TENN.
CODE ANN. § 57-3-204(b)(3)). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down Tennessee’s
liquor license residence provisions. Byrd v. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 883
F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2018). The Tennessee Retailers Association sought and were granted
certiorari only on the initial two-year residence requirement.
220
The trade association argued that residence requirement was permissible under the
21st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which repealed the 18th Amendment (Prohibition).
Specifically, the trade association argued that section 2 of the 21st Amendment, which
provides that “the transportation or importation into any state, territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof,
is hereby prohibited,” insulated the provision from a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
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The Tennessee Wine Court, by a vote of 7 to 2, struck down the
Tennessee residency requirement under the dormant Commerce Clause, and
the seven justices in the majority reiterated in clear and unambiguous terms
their support for a robust dormant Commerce Clause.221 In confirming that
the 21st Amendment was not a license to vitiate other constitutional
protections, the Court made clear that the dormant Commerce Clause is
entitled to no less adherence than any other constitutional doctrine.222 In
describing the longstanding and important role played by the dormant
Commerce Clause, Justice Alito wrote for the majority:
The Commerce Clause . . . provides that Congress shall have
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.
Although the Clause is framed as a positive grant of power
to Congress, we have long held that this Clause also
prohibits state laws that unduly restrict interstate commerce.
This negative aspect of the Commerce Clause prevents states
from adopting protectionist measures and thus preserves a
national market for goods and services.223
Before Tennessee Wine, the Court’s two most recent dormant
Commerce Clause decisions–both tax cases — also garnered large majorities
in favor of the continued validity of the dormant Commerce Clause.224 Thus,
while commentators and jurists — including Supreme Court justices — have
questioned the textual basis and even the wisdom of the dormant Commerce

221

Tennessee Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissented in
Tennessee Wine. See id. Justice Thomas’s negative view of the dormant Commerce Clause is
well known. See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811–12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I continue to
adhere to my view that the negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the
Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application, and
consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a statute.”) (quoting McBurney v.
Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring)). In his dissent in Tennessee Wine,
Justice Gorsuch called the dormant Commerce Clause “peculiar,” noting that it “cannot be
found in the text of any constitutional provision but is (at best) an implication from one.” See
Tennessee Wine, at 2478 (dissenting from the majority’s holding that the challenged regulation
discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause on
the grounds that Congress had consented to the challenged regulation). In Wayfair, Justice
Gorsuch noted that “[w]hether and how much of [dormant Commerce Clause doctrine] can be
squared with the text of the Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or defended as
misbranded products of federalism or antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from Article
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause are questions for another day.” South Dakota v.
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100–01 (2018).
222
Tennessee Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2472–73.
223
Id. at 2459.
224
Although the ultimate questions in Wynne and Wayfair were both resolved on a 5-4
vote, support on the Court for the dormant Commerce Clause more generally was stronger in
both cases. In Wynne, seven justices indicated their support for the doctrine, with Justices
Scalia and Thomas repeating their long-standing disagreement, and in Wayfair only Justice
Thomas expressed his rejection of the doctrine whereas Justice Gorsuch raised questions but
ultimately reserved making an explicit judgment on the validity of the doctrine itself.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550746

394

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 39:3:357

Clause,225 not only do the origins of the judicial doctrine reach back as far as
Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,226 but a large majority of
the current justices continue to support it. Even efforts to cabin dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine typically do not propose allowing the states to
discriminate between in-state and cross-border commerce. Nor do
commentators propose allowing states to obstruct cross-border commerce.
Instead, most would limit the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause to
preventing protectionism and retentionism227 or, like Justice Thomas, they
would ground similar outcomes in different constitutional text.228
Given that removing state trade barriers was a principal reason for the
adoption of the Constitution,229 interpreting the Constitution to permit states
to use their tax and regulatory regimes to impose the functional equivalent of
trade barriers would be hard to justify. It is not surprising, then, that in cases
interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has long
emphasized the connection between trade barriers that existed under the
Articles of Confederation and the call for a new constitution that could
eliminate those barriers. Nearly 140 years ago, for example, the Court wrote
that
state protectionist measures, if maintained by this Court
would ultimately bring our commerce to that oppressed and
degraded state, existing at the adoption of the present
Constitution, when the hapless, inadequate Confederation
was abandoned and the national government instituted.
225

In recent years, some justices have authored vigorous critiques of this interpretation.
See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1808–09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794 (the Commerce Clause “‘reflected a central concern
of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the
States under the Articles of Confederation.’” (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
325–326 (1979)).
227
See Regan, supra note 29 (arguing that the Court strikes down state laws only when
they involve intentional protectionism, even though the Court has not acknowledged that that
is what it does).
228
See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1808–09 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
import/export clause would provide a better textual basis for a constitutional prohibition of
protectionism); Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 612
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (making the same argument). But see Brannon P. Denning,
Justice Thomas, the Import Export Clause, and Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna v. Harrison,
70 COLO. L. REV. 155 (1999) (arguing Thomas is correct about the framers’ intent but rejecting
a wholesale substitution). Cf. Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest,
91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982) (arguing that the values pursued under the dormant Commerce Clause
should be narrowed and protected only under the Privileges and Immunities Clause) with
Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace
the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384 (2003) (arguing that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is not sufficient to vindicate the values protected under the
dormant Commerce Clause).
229
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794 (the Commerce Clause “strikes at one of the chief evils
that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened
interstate commerce”).
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More recently, we observed that our dormant Commerce
Clause cases reflect a central concern of the framers that was
an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional
Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new
Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the colonies
and later among the states under the Articles of
Confederation.230
Considering this history and our established case law, the conclusion
that the Commerce Clause by its own force restricts state protectionism is
deeply rooted in our law and constitutional tradition.231
2.

The Current Status of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause

While it is clear that a majority of the current Supreme Court regards the
dormant interstate Commerce Clause as either not objectionable or required
as a matter of stare decisis, that does not necessarily mean that those views
carry over to the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has
invalidated only two taxes under the dormant foreign Commerce Clause, the
property tax in Japan Line and the facially discriminatory inclusion of
foreign (but not domestic) dividends in Kraft General Foods.232 The Supreme
Court has not considered a dormant foreign Commerce Clause case since the
mid-2000s in Barclays.233 In the absence of other indications, however, we
assume that the Court will continue to apply the dormant foreign Commerce
Clause as a matter of stare decisis, and so must lower courts. Moreover, as
we explained above, the state tax discrimination against foreign commerce
impacts state residents in their capacities not only as consumers, but also as
producers engaged in outbound commerce. This suggests that there is a
similar role to be played by the dormant Commerce Clause in both foreign
and interstate commerce.234

230

Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 440 (1880).
Tennessee Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2459–62 (citations, footnotes, and quotation marks
omitted).
232
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Kraft Gen. Foods
v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 71 (1992).
233
The Supreme Court has avoided dormant foreign Commerce Clause questions. See
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000) (“Because our
conclusion that the state Act conflicts with federal law is sufficient to affirm the judgment
below, we decline to speak to field preemption as a separate issue. . . or to pass on the First
Circuit’s rulings addressing the foreign affairs power or the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause.”).
234
See discussion supra Part I.B.4. One can also imagine an argument that obstructing
foreign commerce also indirectly obstructs interstate commerce.
231
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III. STEINER AND STATE TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME
Having introduced both internal consistency and the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause, we now turn to Steiner. In Steiner, the Utah Supreme
Court upheld a tax regime that was structurally nearly identical to the tax
struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015 in Wynne. We argue that the Utah
Supreme Court erred by refusing to apply Wynne, which was clearly relevant
to Steiner. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Steiner, we
analyze the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in some detail because other
states’ income tax systems may contain the same constitutional infirmity as
Utah’s, namely that their taxes on foreign commerce are internally
inconsistent. This Part therefore provides guidance to other state courts that
confront post-Wynne dormant foreign Commerce Clause challenges to their
regimes for taxing foreign income. For this reason, although it was not
dispositive in Steiner, we also review the application of the external
consistency test to the Utah regime, and we briefly consider the application
of the additional Japan Line factors to that case. The external consistency test
traditionally forms part of the fair apportionment prong of Complete Auto.235
A. Facts and Procedural History of Steiner
Robert Steiner was a resident of Utah and a shareholder in Steiner LLC,
which was taxed as an S corporation.236 Steiner LLC was the sole shareholder
of Alsco Inc., a linen and uniform rental business that services restaurants,
hospitals, and numerous other industries in the United States and in 13 other
countries.237 In foreign markets, Alsco operated through subsidiaries, most
of which had elected to be taxed under U.S. law as partnerships. As a result,
the income earned through Alsco’s foreign business operations passed
through the foreign subsidiaries to Alsco, then to Steiner LLC, and finally to
Steiner himself. Steiner reported that income on his personal tax return,
which he filed jointly with his wife. On their federal tax returns, for 2011,
2012, and 2013 (the tax years in question), the Steiners reported their income
from Steiner LLC and claimed a foreign tax credit for the taxes paid to
foreign jurisdictions on their behalf by their Alsco subsidiaries.

235

Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983) (external
consistency is the idea that the state tax must “reflect a reasonable sense of how income is
generated”).
236
Steiner is also a beneficiary of the trust that is the majority owner of Steiner LLC.
See Steiner v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 449 P.3d 189, 191 (Utah 2019).
237
Alsco, which stands for the American Linen Supply Co., is run by the fourth
generation of the Steiner family. The business was started by George A. Steiner in 1889, but
it took off when his son, George Steiner, patented the continuous cloth roll towel dispenser in
1918. Mike Gorrell, This Linen-Delivery Company Worth $50 in 1889 Has Quietly Become
an International, 4th-Generation Utah Success Story, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Nov. 27,
2017.
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Like many states, Utah taxes its residents on their worldwide income.238
Utah also allowed its residents a credit for income taxes paid to other U.S.
states, but not for taxes paid to foreign countries.239 In an effort to avoid
double foreign and Utah taxation, the Steiners sought a statutory “equitable
adjustment” to exclude their foreign income from Utah tax.240 Under Utah
law, the state tax commission “shall allow an adjustment to adjusted gross
income of a resident or nonresident individual [who] would otherwise . . .
suffer a double tax detriment under this part.”241 The Utah State Tax
Commission disallowed the Steiners’ request for an equitable adjustment to
exclude the foreign income.242
After further procedural wrangling, the Steiners paid their assessed Utah
deficiency and appealed to a Utah district court. The Utah district court ruled
that the Steiners were entitled to an equitable adjustment and allowed the
exclusion.243 The lower Utah court’s ruling was based not only on its
interpretation of the Utah statute, but also its view that the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause required Utah to provide the Steiners with relief because
its regime for taxing international income was internally inconsistent.244 Utah
appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the taxpayers’
constitutional and statutory arguments and granting summary judgment for
the state.245 The principal question on appeal concerned the limits imposed
by the dormant foreign Commerce Clause on states’ ability to tax their
residents’ income from outside the United States.
B. Utah Supreme Court’s Resolution of Steiner
The Utah tax regime upheld in Steiner was similar to the Maryland
regime struck down in Wynne. Both regimes involved a single rate of tax on
residents’ in-state and out-of- state income combined with a positive rate of
tax on the income of nonresidents. Both regimes also shared the feature that
they offered no credit for taxes paid outside the jurisdiction. The only
difference between the two cases was that Wynne concerned taxes paid by
state residents to other U.S. states while Steiner concerned taxes paid by state
residents to other countries.
The Utah Supreme Court offered three reasons why the Utah tax regime,
despite its structural similarity to the unconstitutional Wynne regime, did not
violate the dormant foreign Commerce Clause: (1) the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause applies to corporate, but not individual, income taxes; (2)
238

UTAH CODE § 59-10-103(1)(a)(i) (stating that adjusted gross income is calculated in
accordance with the federal tax system).
239
UTAH CODE § 59-10-1003.
240
Steiner, 449 P.3d at 192; see also UTAH CODE § 59-10-115 (allowing such equitable
adjustments).
241
UTAH CODE § 59-10-115(2)(b).
242
Steiner, 449 P.3d at 192.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id.
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if the dormant foreign Commerce Clause did apply, Utah’s failure to credit
foreign taxes did not violate it, in part because the federal credit for foreign
taxes was adequate to avoid discrimination, and (3) even if Utah’s tax system
discriminated against foreign commerce, Congress passively approved it.246
We refute each of these arguments in turn.
1.

Applicability to Individuals

The Utah Supreme Court’s first holding was that the foreign, as opposed
to the interstate, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine does not apply to
individual taxpayers such as the Steiners,. The Steiner court acknowledged
that the dormant foreign Commerce Clause applies to corporate taxpayers,
and that the dormant interstate Commerce Clause applies to both corporate
and individual taxpayers, but it asserted that the dormant foreign Commerce
Clause does not apply to individual taxpayers.247 The court offered no support
for this proposition, other than an absence of cases in which the U.S. Supreme
Court has affirmatively applied the dormant foreign Commerce Clause to
individuals.248
The Utah court’s reasoning is untenable after Wynne. Wynne expressly
raised the question of whether the dormant Commerce Clause applies to
individual taxpayers, and the Supreme Court’s answer was unequivocal: it
does.249 In Wynne, the Supreme Court flatly rejected Maryland’s argument
that the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to individuals, reasoning
that it is “hard to see why the dormant Commerce Clause should treat
individuals less favorably than corporations.”250
The Utah Supreme Court was aware of this holding from Wynne, but the
Court criticized it for being thinly reasoned.251 The Utah Supreme Court also
246

Id. at 200–01 (citing Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994)).
Id. at 198.
248
Id.
249
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1797.
250
Id.
251
Steiner, 449 P.3d at 195 (the Supreme Court “concluded, with little analysis, that
individuals are also protected by the dormant Commerce Clause — even though the Court had
previously never explicitly held as much.”). Despite the Utah Court’s protestations, the Wynne
majority spent seven paragraphs and nearly 900 words explaining why the dormant Commerce
Clause applied to companies and resident individuals alike. Among the reasons were that: (1)
notwithstanding that prior cases had not raised the question, there was no affirmative argument
for treating resident individuals and corporations differently under the dormant Commerce
Clause, (2) some of the taxes previously invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause
applied to both individuals and corporations, even if the particular challenge was brought by
a corporate taxpayer, (3) resident individuals and corporations could not be meaningfully
distinguished for dormant Commerce Clause purposes because both resident individuals and
corporations received benefits from the state, and (4) although only resident individuals could
vote against discriminatory taxes, such a remedy was insufficient to respond to the
antidiscrimination value vindicated by the dormant Commerce Clause. Finally, (5) Wynne
involved the taxation of a resident individual for income earned by a subchapter S corporation.
Thus, the Wynne Court reasoned that refusing to apply the dormant Commerce Clause to the
Wynnes would “provide greater protection for income earned by larger Subchapter C
corporations than small businesses incorporated under Subchapter S.” Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at
247
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attempted to distinguish Wynne by asserting that the dormant Commerce
Clause applied to individuals only for cases involving the interstate
commerce aspect of that clause, not the foreign commerce aspect.252 The
Utah Supreme Court provided no substantive rationale for limiting the
dormant foreign Commerce Clause to corporations. Rather, it based its
decision on its unfavorable view of the dormant Commerce Clause itself,
which it saw as confused and inconsistent.253
Moreover, nothing in Wynne suggests that limitation. In Wynne, the
Supreme Court referred to the dormant Commerce Clause, not the dormant
interstate Commerce Clause, and it cited a variety of dormant Commerce
Clause cases, including dormant interstate and foreign Commerce Clause
cases.254 If the purposes of the dormant interstate and foreign Commerce
Clauses are to safeguard commerce against protectionism and retentionism
by the states, the dormant Commerce Clause must apply to all commercial
actors, regardless of their form.
2.

Internal Consistency

The Utah Supreme Court’s second argument for upholding the Utah law
was that Utah’s tax treatment of residents’ foreign income did not
discriminate and was fairly apportioned. In our view, the discrimination and
fair apportionment prongs of the Complete Auto test ask the same question,
and fair apportionment typically can be folded into discrimination.255 State
tax regimes and apportionment rules must not tax international or interstate
commerce more heavily than domestic commerce.256 Put equivalently, state
tax laws and regulations violate the dormant Commerce Clause whenever

1798. Like Wynne, Steiner also involved tax on income that individuals earned through an S
corporation. Steiner, 449 P.3d at 197. The principal dissenters in Wynne did not expressly join
or refute the majority’s reasoning that the dormant Commerce Clause applied to individuals
as well as corporations. See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1813–23 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Kagan, J.
and Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Justice Scalia also did not address the question in his
separate dissent, he held narrow views of the dormant Commerce Clause and opposed its
extension.
252
Steiner, 449 P.3d at 198–99.
253
Id. at 193, 202.
254
See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802 (emphasizing “the numerous cases in which we
have applied the internal consistency test in the past”); id. at 1803 (citing various other internal
consistency test cases). See also id. at 1803 (citing statement in Container Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) that the internal consistency test was part of dormant Commerce
Clause analysis); id. at 1799 (citing Barclays Court’s assumption, in a dormant foreign
Commerce Clause case, that the internal consistency test was satisfied) (citing Barclays Bank
PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994)).
255
Knoll & Mason, Massachusetts, supra note 99.
256
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795 (states violate the dormant Commerce Clause when they
“discriminate[] in favor of intrastate over interstate economic activity”). See generally Mason
& Knoll, supra note 47, at 1023–85 (defining tax discrimination as violations of competitive
neutrality, which results from taxing cross-border commerce or out-of-state residents more
heavily than in-state commerce or state residents). See also Lirette & Viard, supra note 29.
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they have protectionist impacts that either cannot be justified on public policy
grounds or have not been approved by Congress.257
In Wynne, the Supreme Court explicitly addressed, first, the importance
of proper economic analysis in making discrimination determinations and,
second, the relevance of the internal consistency test in determining whether
state taxes discriminate by functioning equivalently to tariffs.258 There is
nothing in Wynne to suggest that this approach applies narrowly. On the
contrary, the Wynne Court took pains to establish the breadth of the internal
consistency test, noting that it applied to both incoming and outgoing
commerce, to residents and nonresidents, and to corporations and
individuals, and across a broad range of cases.259 Thus, there is no support in
Wynne — or any other cases — for the notion that the internal consistency
test applies only to interstate, but not foreign, commerce cases. Indeed the
Court has repeatedly emphasized that Complete Auto, including its internal
consistency test, applies in dormant foreign Commerce Clause cases.260
Although the Wynne Court cited dormant foreign Commerce Clause cases as
part of its analysis, it did not emphasize the international aspect of any of the
cases. But the Court’s clear goal in reviewing prior cases was to show the
breadth, not the narrowness, of the test.261
In finding the Utah law nondiscriminatory, the Utah Supreme Court
applied the internal consistency test to Utah’s tax regime for taxing interstate
income,262 but it declined to apply the internal consistency test to Utah’s
regime for taxing international income, even though Utah’s tax on
international income was the only issue at stake in the case. In the court’s
view, “it would make no sense to universalize Utah’s tax system to conduct
a Wynne analysis — Utah is a single, subnational taxing jurisdiction. There
is no proper basis to compare the effect of its tax system with the effect of
those foreign jurisdictions encompassing multiple levels of taxation.”263 As
with the rest of its opinion, the Utah Supreme Court’s analysis of internal
consistency was conclusory; it involved little reasoning other than an
insistence that since the Supreme Court has never applied its dormant foreign
Commerce Clause analysis to a case involving individual taxation, the Utah
court had no guidance as to how to do so itself.264 The Utah court cited no
257

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795. See also Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra

note 29.
258

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.
Id. at 1802–04.
260
See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979);
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169–71 (1983).
261
Id.
262
Steiner v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 449 P.3d 189, 197 (Utah 2019) (Utah’s regime
for taxing interstate income was internally consistent; it credited taxes imposed on Utah
residents by other U.S. states).
263
Id. at 200.
264
Id. at 199 (noting, without citing any authorities or reasons, that “crucial [doctrinal]
distinctions” exist between corporations and individuals, and relying on these distinctions to
observe that “logically, then, individuals and corporations may also be subjected to differing
analytical frameworks under the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. But the Supreme Court
259
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authorities other than one of its own pre-Wynne opinions and the Wynne
dissent’s position that Maryland could tax all of the Wynnes’ out-of-state
income, an issue that was not in dispute in Steiner. Moreover, the Utah
court’s claim that there was no way to evaluate the impact of the Utah tax
system on foreign commerce is tantamount to concluding that the dormant
foreign Commerce Clause does not apply at all to state taxes, a claim refuted
by many Supreme Court cases.265 Indeed, one of the Supreme Court’s most
often quoted descriptions of the internal consistency test comes from
Container, a dormant foreign Commerce Clause case.266 Notwithstanding
that the Supreme Court stated in Container, Barclays, and other cases that
state taxes on foreign commerce must pass the internal consistency test,267
the Utah Supreme Court claimed that the internal consistency test was “quite
impossible to apply in an international setting.”268
We now explain how the internal consistency test would apply in
Steiner. We emphasize that the analysis we present here is the same as that
of the lower Utah court, which apparently had no trouble applying the test.269
Recall that Utah taxed the Steiners on all their income, which comprised instate income, out-of-state income, and foreign income.270 There is nothing
unusual about such a regime. Against the out-of-state income, Utah granted
credits for taxes paid to other U.S. states, but Utah allowed no credits for
foreign income taxes and provided no other nondiscretionary method to
avoid double state and foreign tax.271 Utah taxed nonresidents, including
taxpayers who reside outside the United States,272 on their income earned in
has provided no guidance whatsoever to lower courts regarding how to treat individuals in the
context of foreign commerce. So even if we were inclined to conclude that state taxes of
individual residents are subject to Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause scrutiny, we would be
completely at sea. We would have no idea what test to apply or how to apply it.”) (emphasis
in original). As discussed in Part I.A, supra, due to the bi-directional effects of both
protectionist and retentionist taxes, the dormant Commerce Clause could not effectively
prohibit protectionist taxes if it did not apply to both inbound and outbound commerce.
265
See cases cited supra note 77.
266
See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983) (“The first, and
again obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called
internal consistency — that is the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction,
it would result in no more than all of the unitary business’s income being taxed.”).
267
See supra note 83.
268
Steiner, 449 P.3d at 199.
269
Steiner v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, No. 170901774, 6–7 (Utah Dist. Ct. Jan. 30,
2018). The lower court’s internal consistency analysis consisted of three simple paragraphs in
which it straightforwardly applied the test as described in Wynne and other cases. To reflect
that the challenged tax involves a tax on international, rather than interstate, income, the
district court logically applied the test to international, rather than interstate, income.
270
UTAH CODE § 59-10-103.
271
Utah law gives the Utah tax commissioner discretion to exclude foreign income if
including it would lead to double tax, but the commissioner denied discretionary relief to the
Steiners.
272
See UTAH CODE § 59-10-103(1)(a), (w) (defining Utah adjusted gross income (AGI)
for nonresident individuals as federal adjusted gross income as defined in I.R.C. § 62 with
further adjustments); see also UTAH CODE § 59-10-103(1)(q) (defining nonresident individual
to mean “an individual who is not a resident of this state”); UTAH CODE § 59-10-103(1)(j)
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Utah. This is nearly the same structure as the tax regime found
unconstitutional in Wynne.
The first step in the internal consistency test is hypothetical
harmonization. When courts evaluate state tax regimes under the dormant
interstate Commerce Clause using the internal consistency test, they assume
that all other U.S. states apply the challenged regime. To evaluate Utah’s tax
regime under the dormant foreign Commerce Clause using the internal
consistency test requires only one small change. Instead of assuming that all
other U.S. states adopt the challenged state’s regime, the court could assume
that subdivisions of all other countries do so.273 Thus, to evaluate the Utah
regime under the dormant foreign Commerce Clause, we must consider how
a globally universalized Utah regime would tax international income.
To make our example simple but concrete, assume that the Utah tax rate is
5% on residents’ in-state and foreign income and 5% on nonresident aliens’
income from Utah. Also assume that Utah does not credit taxes assessed on
foreign income.274 To apply the internal consistency test, a court postulates
that all other taxing jurisdictions have adopted the same tax regime as the
jurisdiction under challenge. To further simplify, assume that, in addition to
Utah, there is only one other taxing jurisdiction, Ontario. Under internal
consistency, the reviewing court would assume that Ontario adopts the same
tax rules as Utah. Under this assumption, Ontario would tax its residents at
5% on their income from Ontario and at 5% on their income from Utah (that
is, their foreign income). Ontario would also tax Utahns at 5% on their
income from Ontario. Ontario would not grant its residents credit for taxes
levied by Utah. Under this harmonized regime, Utahns would be taxed at 5%
on their income earned in Utah, but they would be taxed at 10% on their
income earned in Ontario. The 10% tax would arise from a combination of
three effects: Ontario’s tax on Utahns’ Ontario income, Utah’s tax on Utahns’
foreign-source income, and Utah’s failure to credit foreign taxes. Similarly,
Ontarians would be taxed at 5% on their income earned in Ontario, but at
10% on their Utah income. This result — heavier taxation of international
than in-state income — means that the tested Utah tax regime is internally
inconsistent.275 Table 2 demonstrates this effect:
(defining individual to include aliens). The adjustments to federal AGI required for
nonresidents under the Utah Code result in the inclusion of Utah-source income by nonresident
aliens. See UTAH CODE §§ 59-10-114 and 59-10-115. Such Utah-source income includes
income from real property, from a Utah trade or business, and wages earned in Utah. See UTAH
CODE § 59-10-117.
273
Citing Container and Jefferson Lines, the Utah district court stated that “[a]ssuming
that every jurisdiction, including all other states and foreign jurisdictions, has a tax structure
identical to Utah's current structure, the question is whether this tax structure discriminates
against interstate or foreign commerce.” Steiner v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, No. 170901774,
6–7 (Utah Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2018).
274
The income tax rate in Utah for the tax years in question in Steiner was 5%; the rate
is now 4.95%. See UTAH STATE TAX COMM’N, TAX RATES, https://incometax. utah.gov/paying
/tax-rates (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
275
The Utah regime challenged in Steiner may have defined in-state income more
narrowly for foreigners than for Utah residents. See UTAH CODE § 59-10-117 (defining Utah
source income for nonresidents, which includes foreigners). Even if this is so, it would not
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TABLE 2: Utah Foreign Income Tax Regime Under Internal Consistency
Ontario Resident

Utah Resident

Utah Source

10%

5%

Ontario Source

5%

10%

The only difference between Wynne and Steiner is that in Wynne,
Maryland overburdened interstate income relative to in-state income,
whereas in Steiner, Utah overburdened international income relative to instate income.276 It is also worth reiterating that our application of the internal
consistency test is the same as the lower Utah court’s application, which
found the Utah tax regime to be internally inconsistent and held that the
Steiners ought to have therefore been granted an “equitable adjustment”
under Utah law to exclude their foreign-source income.277
3.

Federal Foreign Tax Credit

In addition to refusing to apply Wynne and its internal consistency test,
the Utah Supreme Court in Steiner asserted that the federal credit for foreign
taxes was adequate to resolve any potential discrimination against
international income by Utah, such that requiring state-level relief of double
taxation would provide a double benefit. 278 But that assertion is incorrect.
Applying the internal consistency test to the aggregate of the Utah tax regime
and the federal tax regime with its limited foreign tax credit does not change
the result.
To see why, assume that the Steiners are taxed at 40% at the federal level
and at 5% at the state level. Further assume, consistently with U.S. law, that
the U.S. federal income tax offers individual taxpayers a limited credit for

change the analysis; given the features of Utah’s tax on residents, in the absence of Utah
credits for foreign taxes, the regime will be internally inconsistent if Utah assesses any positive
rate of tax on any Utah-source income, however defined, earned by foreigners.
276
See analysis of Wynne, supra Part I.A. The structures are similar because both
Maryland and Utah imposed a single rate of tax on residents’ in-state and out-of-state income,
a positive rate of tax on nonresidents’ in-state income, and neither state provided a tax credit
for out-of-state income from certain sources. The difference was that Utah denied a credit for
foreign income, whereas Maryland denied a credit for interstate income.
277
Steiner v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, No. 170901774, at 6–7 (Utah Dist. Ct. Jan. 30,
2018). See also Utah Code section 59-10-115 (allowing such equitable adjustments).
278
Steiner v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 449 P.3d 189, 200 (Utah 2019). There is some
question about whether states can defend their discrimination by pointing to compensating
provisions in federal law. Cf. Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S.
71, 81 (1992) (“We find no authority, however, for the principle that discrimination against
foreign commerce can be justified if the benefit to domestic subsidiaries might happen to be
offset by other taxes imposed not by Iowa, but by other States and by the Federal
Government”).
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foreign taxes, up to the amount of U.S. federal tax due on the same income.279
Under the internal consistency test, we would assume all relevant
jurisdictions adopt the same tax structure. Thus, under the hypothetical
harmonization step of the internal consistency test, the reviewing court would
assume that Canada had a 40% federal income tax with a limited credit for
foreign taxes and that each province had a 5% income tax without a credit.
The Steiners would be taxed at a total rate of 45% on their Utah income,
comprised of the 40% U.S. federal tax plus the 5% Utah tax. On their Ontario
income, they would pay a 40% Canadian federal tax, for which they would
receive a credit against their U.S. federal tax liability, eliminating their U.S.
federal liability. The Steiners would also pay a 5% tax to Ontario, but because
they exhausted their U.S. federal credit by using it to relieve double federal
taxation by the United States and Canada, there would be no relief from the
U.S. federal government for the Ontario tax. Thus, in addition to the 5% tax
imposed by Ontario, the Steiners would pay a 5% tax to Utah for the income
they earned in Canada. Thus, the Steiners’ total tax liability on their Ontario
income would 50%. In contrast, had the Steiners earned their income solely
within the United States, they would have paid tax at only 45%. Table 3
illustrates this result.
TABLE 3: Federal and Utah Regime Under Internal Consistency
Ontario Resident

U.S. Resident

Utah Source

50%

45%

Ontario Source

45%

50%

The difference in tax between domestic and international income shows
the internal inconsistency of the Utah regime, notwithstanding the
availability of a U.S. federal credit. The situation would be similar for
residents of Ontario. They would pay 45% tax on their income earned in
Canada and 50% on their income earned in the United States, as illustrated
in the table above. The Utah tax thus violates internal consistency: it
discourages Utahns from earning income abroad, and it discourages
foreigners from earning income in Utah. Thus, whether examined as a standalone tax or in combination with the federal income tax, the Utah tax violates
internal consistency and hence discriminates against foreign commerce.
The Utah Supreme Court was correct that in reality, as opposed to the
formality of the internal consistency test, some federal credits may be
available to offset other countries’ subnational taxes.280 But the Utah
Supreme Court was wrong that such federal credits will always be sufficient.
The Utah court also did not base its conclusion on a particularized inquiry
279

See I.R.C. § 904 (providing limited foreign tax credit).
This would be so if, for example, the foreign federal tax rate is lower than the U.S.
federal tax rate.
280
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into the Steiners’ situation to determine whether, in this particular case,
excess foreign credits were available to compensate the Steiners for Utah’s
discrimination. Later, in Part III, we consider how states might take the
federal credit for foreign taxes into account as part of a regime that is
internally consistent in its treatment of international income.
4.

Passive Congressional Approval

The Utah Supreme Court’s final reason for upholding the Utah regime
was that even if it did discriminate against foreign commerce in violation of
the Commerce Clause, it was nevertheless valid under the doctrine of
“passive congressional approval” as announced by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Barclays.281 This conclusion misreads Barclays.
Recall that Barclays involved a dormant foreign Commerce Clause
challenge brought by a foreign firm with U.S. subsidiaries against
California’s worldwide apportionment regime. Having determined that the
challenged California regime did not violate the Complete Auto test,
including that it was not discriminatory,282 the Barclays Court went on to
consider the two additional Japan Line restrictions on state taxation that
apply to dormant foreign, but not dormant interstate, Commerce Clause
cases.283
As part of its consideration of whether the California tax inhibited the
federal government’s prerogative to speak with one voice on foreign affairs,
the Barclays Court considered the possibility that the federal government
may have passively indicated that “certain state practices do not ‘impair
federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.’”284
Passive indicators might include Congress declining to pass legislation
prohibiting the challenged tax.285 For example, in Barclays, the Court
ascertained implicit congressional approval of the challenged California
apportionment regime from years of congressional consideration and
rejection of federal tax bills to bring the California regime into alignment
with the federal and international practice of separate accounting with arms’length transfer pricing.286 It also considered the long history of federal tax
treaties that did not cover state taxes and therefore did nothing to prevent the
challenged California tax regime.
The Barclays Court, however, never suggested that Congress might
passively (as opposed to actively) sanction a discriminatory tax.287
281

Steiner, 449 P.3d at 200 n.18.
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 322 (1994).
283
Id.
284
Id. at 323 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448
(1979)) (emphasis in original).
285
Id.
286
Id. at 324.
287
Id. (“requiring an ‘unambiguous indication of congressional intent’ to insulate
‘otherwise invalid state legislation’ from judicial dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny”)
(quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)).
282
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Congressional consent to a discriminatory state law must be explicit.288
Because the Utah tax regime discriminates, explicit congressional consent
would be required to uphold it. Such consent is not present for the Utah tax
regime considered in Steiner.289
C. External Consistency and the Japan Line Factors
Although not crucial for the outcome in Steiner, we want to address
some additional errors and omissions by the Utah Supreme Court because
they may be relevant to challenges in other courts. The first involves the
application of the external consistency test, which is one of the considerations
under the fair-apportionment prong of Complete Auto. The second involves
the application of the Japan Line factors, which the Utah Supreme Court
simply did not consider.
1.

External Consistency

In Container, the Supreme Court recognized two aspects of fair
apportionment: internal consistency and external consistency.290 Internal
consistency requires that, if universalized, the state’s regime must not result
in over-taxation of cross-border income compared to domestic income.
External consistency requires the state’s tax to “reflect a reasonable sense of
how income is generated”.291 The external consistency test, like the nexus
prong of Complete Auto, overlaps with due process; it concerns fairness and
examines the connection between income-generating activities in the state
and the income the state seeks to tax.292 The Utah Supreme Court concluded
that after Wynne external consistency no longer applies as part of dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, so the Utah court provided no analysis or
substantive discussion of external consistency. Although we think the
conclusion that the external consistency test no longer applies was wrong,
288

Thus, in Barclays, the Court considered the central question whether California’s
worldwide combined reporting requirement “impair[ed] federal uniformity . . . in an area
where such uniformity is central.” Id. at 320.
In both Wardair and Container, the Court considered the “one voice” argument only
after determining that the challenged state action was otherwise constitutional. An
important premise underlying both decisions is this: Congress may more passively
indicate that certain state practices do not impair federal uniformity in an area where
federal uniformity is essential; it need not convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity
required to permit state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce or
otherwise falls short under Complete Auto inspection.
Id. at 323–24 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
289
Under our analysis, the Utah Supreme Court would not reach these additional
questions because the Utah tax regime is internally inconsistent and therefore discriminatory
under the Complete Auto test.
290
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
291
Id.
292
Id. at 169–70 (“[w]e will strike down the application of an apportionment formula if
the taxpayer can prove by clear and cogent evidence that the income attributed to the State is
in fact out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted in that State.”).
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the Utah court’s error was harmless because the external consistency test was
irrelevant to Steiner (and was irrelevant to Wynne).
The Utah Supreme Court’s conclusion that the external consistency
doctrine was a dead letter rested on two arguments. First, because the U.S.
Supreme Court recommended as a potential solution in Wynne a tax regime
that the Utah court regarded as externally inconsistent, the Utah court
assumed that the U.S. Supreme Court must have intended to overrule the
external consistency test. Second, because the Wynne court never expressly
considered external consistency, it must be a dead letter.293 Both arguments
are faulty.
First, consider the supposedly externally inconsistent suggestion the
U.S. Supreme Court offered to Maryland in Wynne.294 The Supreme Court
noted that Maryland could have avoided discrimination by taxing its
residents on all their income wherever earned, with no credit for other states’
taxes, provided that Maryland also did not tax nonresidents’ Maryland
income at all.295 The Utah Supreme Court declared that because such a
regime would not involve an apportionment formula, it must be externally
inconsistent.296 But there is nothing externally inconsistent about the regime
the U.S. Supreme Court suggested to Maryland. Residence-based taxation is
widely acknowledged to be a reasonable and fair basis upon which to levy
unapportioned worldwide taxes.297 Although such unapportioned worldwide
taxation raises a risk of double taxation, if Maryland paired it with either
credits for source taxes or nontaxation of nonresidents’ income sourced in
Maryland (that is, exemption by Maryland of nonresidents’ Maryland-source
income, as suggested by the Supreme Court), the Maryland regime would not
raise an undue risk of double taxation. Nor would it tax more than Maryland’s
fair share of interstate or international income.298 It thus would be both
internally and externally consistent.

293

See Steiner v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 449 P.3d 189, 197–98 (Utah 2019) (“Utah’s
tax code thus satisfies the internal consistency test. In Wynne, the Supreme Court declined to
require anything else of Maryland’s tax . . . . It would be an extension of Wynne to require that
these taxes also satisfy external consistency.”).
294
Id. at 196 (“The Wynne Court thus went out of its way to endorse a tax regime
violative of the external consistency test.”).
295
Id.
296
Id.
297
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 411 (AM. LAW INST.
1987) (acknowledging residence-based tax of worldwide income).
298
There are infinite ways to split cross-border income among the states, and the
Supreme Court long has held that it will not foist on a state any one particular splitting rule.
See Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (holding that a state was free
to adopt an apportionment formula that differed from the formula used by forty-four of the
forty-six states imposing an income tax); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S.
298, 312 (1994) (indicating the need for a “rational relationship between the income attributed.
. . and the intrastate values of the enterprise”). See also discussion of Container and Barclays,
supra Part I.B.2.b.
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The Utah Supreme Court seems to hold the view that to be fairly
apportioned, state taxes must involve apportionment formulas,299 but that is
incorrect. Fair apportionment is about the division of income among the
states and the degree of connection between the taxing state and the income
it seeks to tax. Like apportionment formulas, source and residence rules can
also fairly apportion income among states. Indeed, as far as we know, not
only do all U.S. states that tax the income of natural persons use source-andresidence rules to divide income up among the taxing states, so do all nations.
Source-and-residence rules are fairly apportioned — they will pass the
external consistency test — provided that they reflect real connections to the
state and do not overtax cross-border income.300 Few would argue that
residents are insufficiently connected to their states to support taxation of
their worldwide income. Indeed, as recently as Wynne, the Supreme Court
affirmed that states may tax their residents on all their income.301 Likewise,
few would argue that inclusion of residents’ worldwide income overtaxes it.
Although the Utah Supreme Court was correct when it wrote that “slicing the
pie is the quintessential point of external consistency,”302 it was wrong that
slicing the pie fairly requires formula apportionment. Source-and-residence
rules — with or without double taxation relief — can also slice the pie fairly.
The Utah Supreme Court’s second argument for the death of external
consistency was that the Supreme Court did not consider it in Wynne. But no
conclusion about the continued relevance of the test can be drawn from this
omission because the external consistency test was so clearly satisfied in
Wynne, a case that involved taxation by Maryland of its own residents’
income. However, for the same reasons, the Utah tax regime likewise
satisfies the external consistency test; there is nothing wrong with Utah
taxing on both source and residence bases, provided that its source and
residence rules are sensibly defined and internally consistent. Nor was there
any indication in Steiner that Utah had unusual source or residence rules that
taxed income that had no relation to the state or its residents.
We agree with the Utah Supreme Court that the current status of the
external consistency test is unclear, especially after cases like Quill and
Wayfair that suggest that nexus issues will be resolved under the due process
clause rather than the dormant commerce clause.303 Nonetheless, we believe
299

See Steiner, 449 P.3d at 196 (quoting Note, Dormant Commerce Clause — Personal
Income Taxation — Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 129 HARV. L. REV.
181, 186–87 (2015), which argued that the worldwide tax rule imposed at residence and paired
with no credits for foreign tax and no source tax of any kind “‘would seem to squarely violate
the external consistency test,’ which requires states to apportion income such that it ‘reflect[s]
a reasonable sense of how income is generated’”).
300
See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (external
consistency is about “whether a state’s tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly
attributable to activity within the taxing state”) (citation omitted).
301
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1818 (2015).
See also Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462–63 (1995).
302
Steiner, 449 P.3d at 196.
303
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305–08 (1992); South Dakota v. Wayfair
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). Cf. Mason, Implications of Wayfair, 46 INT’L TAX REV. 810,
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that the external consistency test — or a principle like it — is needed to serve
as a check on states that might seek to impose tax rules that, while internally
consistent, do not reasonably reflect contacts between the taxpayer and the
taxing state.304 But courts need not consider external consistency in cases like
Wynne and Steiner that involve taxation by residence states that have a clear
and well established entitlement to tax their residents’ worldwide income.305
2.

Japan Line Factors

In our view, the Utah Supreme Court should have held the Utah regime
to be internally inconsistent and therefore discriminatory. If a state tax
discriminates against foreign commerce, then it is unconstitutional unless
justified or expressly congressionally approved, and there is no reason for a
reviewing court to go on to consider the Japan Line factors. However, if a
state court determines that a challenged state’s taxes meet the Complete Auto
factors, as the Utah Supreme Court did, then it should go on to consider the
Japan Line factors. For completeness, we consider the application of the
Japan Line factors to the facts of Steiner.
a.

Substantial Risk of Multiple International Tax

We argued above that the Supreme Court has failed to provide lower
courts with clear guidance with respect to either of the Japan Line factors.
The first additional consideration is whether the challenged regime creates
an “enhanced risk of multiple taxation.”306 It is hard to know what the
Supreme Court means by this. One thing it apparently does not mean is that
the U.S. state tax leads to actual double tax for the aggrieved taxpayer — it
is clear after Container and Barclays that such actual double tax is not by
itself sufficient to violate Japan Lines. The Japan Line Court stressed the
“inevitability” of double taxation that arose from California’s apportioned
property tax on nonresidents and Japan’s unapportioned tax on residents. It
distinguished such “inevitable” double tax from the mere happenstance or
coincidental overlapping tax that arose in Container and Barclays from the

814–15 (2018) (arguing that “while the Wayfair Court did not give up on the idea that due
process nexus and dormant Commerce Clause nexus could be different, it held that ‘there are
significant parallels’ between them and ‘physical presence is not necessary to create a
substantial nexus’ for either”) (quoting Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 10).
304
Internal and external consistency do not completely collapse into each other. For
example, an income tax assessed on all individuals born in the state (and only those
individuals) would be internally consistent but not externally consistent. It would be internally
consistent because if all states adopted it, exactly all (no more and no less) of a taxpayer’s
income would be taxed once. But because the connections between the taxpayer and her state
of birth are so much weaker than her connections with her state of domicile, such a rule likely
would fail external consistency. The birth state would be regarded as taxing income that more
properly belonged to another state.
305
The issue of external consistency could come up in a subsequent case if a taxpayer
challenged an internally consistent rule.
306
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
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selection by California and countries of “two distinct methods of allocating
the income of a multi-national enterprise.”307
Was the double tax in Steiner more like the “inevitable” double tax of
Japan Line or more like the mere overlap in Container and Barclays? We do
not see as much difference as does the Supreme Court between the double
tax of Japan Line and the double tax of Container and Barclays. In our view,
neither case involved protectionism or retentionism, and therefore neither
involved discrimination. Rather, both cases involved double taxation that
arose from mismatched, but internally consistent, rules adopted by two
different taxing jurisdictions. Steiner is different from all three precedents
that involved California — Steiner involved protectionist and retentionist
taxation by Utah that discriminated against foreign commerce relative to
domestic commerce. Because the Utah tax was internally inconsistent, the
double tax it causes could more accurately be called inevitable than that
arising from either of the Japan Line or Container/Barclays regimes.
Another difference between Japan Line and Container that the Supreme
Court emphasized was whether changing state law could be successful at
eliminating double tax. The Supreme Court declined to force California to
replace its formulary apportionment regime with separate accounting
because even if every jurisdiction used separate accounting, double tax might
still arise since different jurisdictions enforce separate accounting
differently.308 As we discuss in Part III, there are multiple ways that the Utah
tax regime could be brought into conformity with the internal consistency
test, some of which would definitely eliminate any risk of multiple
international tax, but those methods may involve complete forbearance on
Utah’s part in taxing certain types of income, which the U.S. Supreme Court,
following Container, presumably would not impose on Utah. 309
Our main conclusion on the “risk of international double tax” prong of
Japan Line is that it is not only unclear what it requires, but it is also unclear
what it could add to the internal consistency test. If the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause, like the dormant interstate Commerce Clause, prevents
protectionism, then the internal consistency test is sufficient for determining
whether a state imposes a protectionist tax. Nor is it necessary or important
for the Supreme Court to have jurisdiction over other countries’ tax or
apportionment rules to ensure that any particular U.S. state complies with the

307

Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 188 (1983) (“Whether the
combination of the two methods results in the same income being taxed twice or in some
portion of income not being taxed at all is dependent solely on the facts of the individual
case.”); id. at 188–89 (multiple tax was not the “inevitable result” of the California
apportionment rule).
308
See id. at 191 (“if California were to adopt some version of the arm’s-length
approach, it could not eliminate the risk of double taxation of corporations subject to its
franchise tax, and might in some cases end up subjecting those corporations to more serious
double taxation than would occur under formula apportionment”).
309
Id.. at 190 (a holding that prevented California from assessing income taxation on a
domestic company with foreign operations would involve “obvious unfairness [that] requires
no elaboration”).
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strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause.310 If a state’s tax violates the
internal consistency test, it is protectionist and presumptively discriminatory,
notwithstanding what other states or countries might do. Likewise, that
another state or country tax might impose an internally inconsistent and
therefore protectionist tax has no bearing on whether the instant state violates
the dormant Commerce Clause.311 Thus, it is unclear what, if anything,
survives or should survive of the Japan Line “multiple tax” doctrine after
Wynne.
b.

One Voice

The other requirement under Japan Line is that the state must not
interfere with the federal government’s ability to speak with one voice.
Because we conclude that the Steiner court should have held that Utah’s
discriminatory regime violated Complete Auto, under Barclays, an explicit
statement of congressional consent would be required to uphold the Utah rule
under this factor.312 Nevertheless, because other courts may need to analyze
other regimes that comply with the Complete Auto factors, we note that tax
treaties between the United States and other countries do not apply to state
taxes, and so despite the fact that the federal government has had ample
opportunity to require states to credit foreign taxes, it has never done so.
Thus, a state court considering “otherwise constitutional”313 taxes under the
“one voice” doctrine can cite such treaties as evidence that Congress has at
least “passively” indicated that such practices do not impair federal
uniformity.
D. Why Steiner Matters
In its unanimous decision in Steiner, the Utah Supreme Court did little
to conceal its antipathy to the dormant Commerce Clause. For example, after
discussing Steiner’s facts and procedural history, the court criticized the U.S.
Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, citing a 60-year-old
Supreme Court case in which the Court called its own doctrine a
310

That the Supreme Court could not force Japan to apportion its property tax on
shipping containers was one reason it gave for forcing California to forego property tax of
such containers. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447, 454.
311
There was a dispute between the majority and principal dissent in Wynne as to
whether it mattered, in evaluating whether a challenged state violated the dormant Commerce
Clause, how other states taxed. The majority held that it did not, whereas the dissenters thought
that what other states do mattered. See Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29,
at 336–42 (discussing the distinction the majority drew between discriminatory double tax,
which arises from a single state’s imposition of internally inconsistent taxes, and
nondiscriminatory double tax, which arises from multiple states’ imposition of different but
internally consistent regimes). We explain that adoption by a state of an internally consistent
rule will not have protectionist effects, regardless of what other states do. In contrast, adoption
by a state of an internally inconsistent rule will have protectionist effects, regardless of what
other states do. Id.
312
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
313
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 323 (1994).
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“quagmire.”314 The Utah Supreme Court observed that “not much has
changed . . . except perhaps to add more room for controversy and confusion
and little in the way of precise guides to the states in the exercise of their
indispensable power of taxation.”315 The Utah court distained what it
described as “judicially jury-rigged multipart tests”316 and lamented that
“lower courts are operating largely in the dark in this important field of
constitutional law.”317 Although the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged its
obligation to follow controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent, it concluded
that — given the “lack [of] any clear overarching theory”318 and the difficulty
a lower court will have “in attempting to anticipate expansion of the law into
new territory”319 — the Utah court itself would “decline to extend [the U.S.
Supreme Court’s] precedent into new territory — even in ways that might
seem logical in other jurisprudential realms.”320 In taking such an unusual
step, the court claimed that it was doing so “not out of any disrespect for the
U.S. Supreme Court, but in our best attempt at judicial humility in a
constitutional field marked more by haphazard policy judgments than any
unifying legal theory.”321 Steiner represents an example of the hostility of
some lower courts to the dormant Commerce Clause generally, but more
importantly, it is the second example of a state supreme court refusing to
apply the main lesson of Wynne — namely that state taxes that are internally
inconsistent are unconstitutional unless justified or explicitly approved by
Congress. Wynne represents the best chance to lead courts out of the
quagmire of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, but it can only serve that
role if courts apply it.
In applying Supreme Court precedent, an inferior court or a state court
“must follow its best understanding of governing precedent.”322 It is not the
court’s “job to re-litigate or trim or expand Supreme Court decisions, [but]
to follow them as closely and carefully and dispassionately as [they] can.”323
Courts are not to take a “too-narrow view of holdings . . . as a means . . . to
evade precedents that cannot be distinguished.”324 Although there is room for
legitimate disagreement over what is the most reasonable reading of a case
and whether a rule articulated in one case should apply in a different
situation, state courts and inferior federal courts are obliged to faithfully
314

Steiner v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 449 P.3d 189 (Utah 2019), at para. 16 (citing
Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
315
Id. at 193 (citing DIRECTV v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 364 P.3d 1036 (Utah 2015)).
316
Id. at 201. See also id. at 119 n.17 (“we see no basis for stumbling through these
nesting layers of unknowns until the Supreme Court lights the way”).
317
Id. at 193.
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Id.
322
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, 682 F.3d 1, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2012).
323
Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, 808 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
324
Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2025 (1994).
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adhere to relevant precedent. To do otherwise threatens to overturn the
structure of constitutional law and lead to a proliferation of inconsistent
interpretations and applications of the Constitution across the United States.
Although state court judges are rarely willing to confront the Supreme
Court directly by explicitly declining to follow precedent, state courts have
made ever more strained arguments to avoid applying dormant Commerce
Clause precedents.325 In Steiner, the Utah court struggled mightily to avoid
applying the precedent established by the Supreme Court in Wynne to a tax
regime with a nearly identical structure. But members of the Utah Supreme
Court do not have the prerogative to sharply cabin existing Supreme Court
precedent. They are obliged to faithfully adhere to it: “State courts, as much
as federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law.”326 Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine cannot be ignored, but that is effectively what the
Utah high court did. Other state courts considering questions similar to those
in Steiner, however, may wish to apply Wynne, and this Part provided
guidance on how to do that. The next Part considers remedies for cases in
which a court finds a state tax regime to violate the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause because it is internally inconsistent.
IV. DESIGNING AN INTERNALLY CONSISTENT TAX ON FOREIGN INCOME
In this Part, we briefly consider how states might formulate their tax
treatment of foreign income to make it internally consistent, and therefore
compliant with the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. A state has available
to it a wide variety of options for curing the constitutional infirmity in its tax
regime, but they fall into three major patterns: apportionment, rate
recalibration, and credits. There are examples of all three groups that would
satisfy the internal consistency test:
Option 1. Domestic apportionment. A state could apportion domestic
income and only domestic income across the states.
Option 2. Worldwide apportionment. A state could apportion worldwide
income across the globe.
325

State courts have drawn fine distinctions to avoid applying Wynne to invalidate
internally consistent taxes, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Wynne on the
deep historical roots of the test and its broad application across a wide range of taxes and tax
rules. See, e.g., Edelman v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation and Fin., 162 A.d.3d 574, 575
(N.Y. App. Div. 2018) cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 134 (2019) (holding that “Wynne is
distinguishable from . . . the instant case, in two critical respects. First, it did not involve
individuals who faced double taxation on intangible investment income by virtue of being
domiciliaries of one state and statutory residents of another. Second, the income subject to tax
in Wynne was not intangible investment income, but business income, traceable to an out-ofstate source.” See also id. at 575–76 (“Nor does Wynne, by establishing that the ‘internal
consistency’ test must be applied wherever there is Commerce Clause scrutiny, abrogate [our
prior holding that when] Commerce Clause scrutiny reveals that the statute at issue does not
affect interstate commerce, there is no need for a test determining whether the statute unduly
burdens interstate commerce.”). For the argument that the New York residence rule challenged
in Edelman was internally inconsistent and unconstitutional, see Michael S. Knoll & Ruth
Mason, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax Residence Rule, 85 TAX NOTES ST. 707 (2019).
326
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983).
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Option 3. Eliminate the Outbound Tax. A state could eliminate the
outbound tax. In other words, it could exclude residents’ foreign-source
income.
Option 4. Eliminate the Inbound Tax. A state could also eliminate the
inbound tax on foreign residents. That is to say, a state could forgo taxing the
in-state income of foreign residents.
Option 5. Increase the Domestic Tax Rate. A state could alternatively
increase its tax rate on the in-state income of residents to eliminate any excess
burden on cross-border commerce that applying the internal consistency test
reveals.
Option 6. Mirror image credit. A state (a subnational political division)
could credit all taxes paid to foreign subnational political entities; states
would not have to credit taxes paid to foreign national governments.
Option 7. Residual credit. A state could credit foreign taxes paid
(whether paid to national governments or political subdivisions thereof) to
the extent such taxes are not credited by the U.S. federal government.
This Part briefly examines the foregoing options.
A. Apportionment
One way a state could satisfy the internal consistency test would be by
substituting formulary apportionment for separate accounting and arm’slength pricing to assign income to jurisdictions. There are two apportionment
methods that a state could adopt that would satisfy the internal consistency
test without having to change tax rates.
Option 1: Domestic apportionment. A tax system that apportioned only
U.S. income among the fifty states according to an internally consistent
formula and exempted foreign income from state taxation would satisfy the
dormant Commerce Clause. If universalized, such a system would apply state
taxes only to a portion of income earned within the United States. Although
such a system would be constitutional, it is likely to be viewed as politically
undesirable because all foreign income earned by a state’s residents would
be excluded from that state’s tax base.327
Option 2: Worldwide apportionment. A second option would be to use
something like California’s worldwide apportionment regime upheld in
Container and Barclays.328 Although California uses apportionment for
corporate taxation, it could be extended to individuals’ earned income. Under
such a regime, the state would calculate the taxpayer’s worldwide income;
and then apportion it according to any internally consistent formula that
compared the presence of in-state factors to worldwide factors. The
California regime upheld in Container and Barclays equally weighted
327

Such a system would substitute for source-and-residence based taxation.
Under international pressure, California dropped its system of worldwide
apportionment for corporations in favor of a water’s-edge approach that, as a first step, used
separate accounting to allocate income to the United States and, as a second step, applied
domestic apportionment to apportion the income allocated to the United States in the first step
among the states.
328
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property, payroll and sales. Although it would be strange by international
practice to use such a complicated system to tax the earned income of
individuals, using it to apportion the income of a complex S Corporation
operating in many jurisdictions (like the Steiners’ company) would be more
reasonable. Obviously, the state would have to use an internally consistent
formula — one that compared factor presence in the state to world factor
presence. Under this approach, a state would be able to tax its proportional
share of the foreign income of its residents, but to be internally consistent, it
would also have to exempt the share of in-state income of residents that was
allocable elsewhere under the formula.329
B. Rate Recalibration
Because switching to apportionment would constitute a fundamental
change in its tax system for individuals, we next describe the two approaches
available to states that maintain separate accounting. A state could
reconfigure the rates of its current tax system so that under internal
consistency, the tax on in-state income earned by residents (i.e., domestic
tax) was no higher than the combination of the tax on residents’ economic
activities abroad (outbound tax) plus the tax on foreign residents’ economic
activities in the state (inbound tax). The state’s goal, in amending its rate
structure to comply with the dormant foreign Commerce Clause, would be to
satisfy the following tax rate condition:

Td ≥

To + Ti – (To x Ti),

where Td , or the domestic tax, is the tax on residents’ in-state income;
To , or the outbound tax is the tax on residents’ foreign-source income, and
Ti, or the inbound tax, is the tax rate on nonresident aliens’ in-state income.330
Although there are infinitely many combinations of these three rates that
would satisfy internal consistency, we note the following three options as
edge cases.
Option 3: Eliminate the Outbound Tax. The simplest approach towards
foreign income and the most straightforward is an exclusion by a state of its
residents’ foreign source income. Such a cross-border tax system is
sometimes called “territorial taxation” or “exemption,” and, as can be readily
seen, it is internally consistent.
Recall Utah’s tax regime, upheld in Steiner despite its internal
inconsistency. Suppose that Utah wanted to make the regime internally
consistent. If Utah were to exclude residents’ foreign income, and if Ontario
were assumed to adopt the same tax system as Utah (as the internal
consistency test calls for), then residents of Utah and residents of Ontario
would both be taxed at 5% wherever they earn income. No one would be
329

Again, such a system would substitute for source-and-residence based taxation.
See Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at 323; Lirette & Viard,
supra note 29, at 483.
330
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taxed at home on income earned in the other country. Because the total tax
rate would be 5% regardless of where one earned income, such a tax would
be internally consistent. Moreover, although Utah’s tax treatment of income
earned by Utah residents in other U.S. states under such a system would differ
from its tax treatment of income earned by Utah residents in foreign
countries, this would not impact the existing law imposing a tax rate of 5%
on Utahns’ in-state income, with a tax credit available for source taxes
assessed by other U.S. states.
Option 4: Eliminate the Inbound Tax. Alternatively, a state could tax
residents’ domestic and foreign income at the same rate if it completely
eliminated its tax on foreign residents’ in-state income. Such a tax regime
would be internally consistent because under hypothetical harmonization,
other subnational jurisdictions (like Ontario) would not tax a U.S.-state
resident’s income (that is, Ontario would exempt Utahns’ Ontario-source
income) and hence taxation of foreign income would only occur in the state
of residence, and at the same rate as for in-state income. Moreover, such a
tax system, although different from the treatment of income earned in other
U.S. states, can exist alongside a full credit for taxes paid to other U.S. states
without creating tension because both systems are internally consistent with
the same tax rate on residents’ in-state income.
Option 5: Increase the Domestic Tax Rate. Every taxpayer bringing a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge against a state tax hopes that the
remedy will be a refund of tax. But discrimination can be cured not only by
refunding taxes to the group that experienced discrimination, but also by
increasing the taxes of the favored group. As the Supreme Court observed in
Wynne, “[w]henever government impermissibly treats like cases differently,
it can cure the violation by either ‘leveling up’ or ‘leveling down.’ Whenever
a State impermissibly taxes interstate commerce at a higher rate than
intrastate commerce, that infirmity could be cured by lowering the higher
rate, raising the lower rate, or a combination of the two.”331
A state can make its tax system internally consistent not only by
lowering taxes, but also by raising taxes that residents pay on in-state income.
For example, to make its regime internally consistent, Utah could increase
the tax rate on the in-state income of Utahns up to the sum of the tax rate on
nonresidents’ Utah income and residents’ out-of-state income.332 If, for
example, Utah were to increase the tax rate on residents’ domestic income
from 5% to roughly 10%,333 Utah could retain its 5% tax rate on Utahns’
foreign income and its 5% tax rate on the Utah income of nonresidents. If
such a tax were universalized, then both foreign and in-state income would

331

Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1806 (2015).
Knoll & Mason, Economic Foundation, supra note 29, at 341.
333
If the Utah tax rate on residents’ out-of-state and on nonresidents’ in-state income
was 5% and Utah taxed its residents on their worldwide income without allowing a deduction
for taxes paid to other states, then the tax rate on residents’ in-state income would have to rise
to 10% to achieve internal consistency. If, however, Utah allowed residents a deduction for
the taxes paid on foreign income, then the in-state rate would have to rise to only 9.75%.
332
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be taxed at 10%. Accordingly, such a tax system is internally consistent in its
treatment of foreign and in-state income.
Such an approach, however, would impose a higher tax on state
residents’ in-state income than is necessary to achieve internal consistency
in regards to interstate commerce if the state credits taxes imposed by other
U.S. states, as Utah does. As a result, such a tax would discourage state
residents from earning in-state income as compared to income from other
U.S. states, because only income earned in other U.S. states would be eligible
for credits.334 Such “reverse discrimination” is not unconstitutional, but it is
not common either as it is politically unpalatable. One solution would be for
a state that selects this option to repeal its credit for taxes paid to other U.S.
states.
C. Tax Credits
The last class of tax systems that satisfies internal consistency is
worldwide taxation with a limited (or more generous) tax credit — a limited
tax credit is a tax credit offered by a residence state for taxes paid to other
jurisdictions on income earned in other jurisdictions up to, but not beyond,
the taxpayer’s tentative tax liability to the residence state on the same
income.335 Income tax systems with a limited tax credit (but no more) are
fairly common. There are at least two ways that a state could grant tax credits
to residents with foreign income that would arguably be internally consistent.
Option 6: Mirror image credit. A state could follow the lead of some
states and municipalities after Wynne and adopt a mirror image tax system
for the credit. Under this approach, the state would credit taxes paid abroad
if, but only if, those taxes are assessed at a subnational level similar to the
level of the U.S. states. Such a system, which is how most states eliminate
double U.S.-state taxation, would be internally consistent. Such a credit,
however, would overcompensate residents whenever a resident’s federal
credit had already effectively compensated them for subnational foreign
taxes.336
This possibility of a double credit might lead the state to restrict access
to the credit while maintaining internal consistency, for example by
prohibiting double crediting of subnational taxes. Such techniques implicate
the external consistency strand of tax discrimination, which requires a
reasonable connection between the income the state seeks to tax and the
income-generating activities conducted in state.337

334

Such a tax would also provide Utahns with a tax-induced advantage over
nonresidents in earning income in other U.S. states.
335
No state offers an unlimited tax credit. Because such a system has the potential to
lead to massive refunds, at most states offer a limited credit, a credit that would zero out the
taxpayer’s liability to the residence state.
336
Utah residents would be overcompensated whenever foreign taxes were less than
federal taxes on the same income.
337
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
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Option 7: Residual credit. An alternative approach to the foreign tax
credit would start with the recognition that a dollar of tax is a dollar of tax
whether it is imposed at the national or subnational level. Thus, it makes
sense to allow a state credit for taxes paid to foreign national and subnational
governments so long as those taxes have not already been credited by the
U.S. federal government. This would entail a holistic approach to internal
consistency, but a residual credit could be complicated to implement and
comply with for some taxpayers.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court declined certiorari in Steiner, the
fundamental question it raises, What limits does the dormant foreign
Commerce Clause impose on state tax powers? is unlikely to go away. Many
states tax foreign commerce in a manner that violates the internal consistency
test, which the Court in Wynne made clear is the principal test for determining
whether a state tax regime discriminates in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause. For example, roughly half of the states tax both residents’
worldwide income and nonresident aliens’ in-state income, but do not offer
residents a credit for taxes paid outside the United States. Such tax systems
likely fail the internal consistency test.338 And even tax systems that provide
foreign tax credits can fail the internal consistency test if the credit is not
sufficiently broad. Accordingly, other taxpayers, both domestic and foreign,
will likely bring Wynne challenges to their state’s international tax regimes,
and not every state court will defy the Supreme Court by refusing to apply
relevant dormant Commerce Clause precedents. Thus, sooner or later, the
Supreme Court may hear a request to resolve conflicting interpretations by
state courts of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. Until that time,
uncertainty and inconsistency are likely to remain.

338

Only if the domestic tax rate were as high as the inbound and outbound tax rates
together would the state’s tax system be internally consistent. We are not aware of any such
state tax system.
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